Carl Anton Martini and Natural Law at the University of Vienna after 1752
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Abstract
Natural law as a discipline was definitively institutionalized at universities in the Habsburg monarchy during the reforms of Maria Theresia after 1752. The guiding principles of these reforms were set in the instruction for the chair of natural law in Vienna which was given to Carl Anton Martini. It was Catholic in conception, but it ordered the professor to draw on Grotius. Our article reconstructs the elementary structure of Martini’s theory of natural law with a focus on his conception of state. The article proves that Martini did not adopt Wolff’s conception of deducing duties and obligations from the highest principle for that would conflict with the Catholic emphasis on freedom of will. Instead of that, Martini derived duties and rights from the three God-given ends. Martini perceived the state as based on social contract, after the model of Christian Wolff. However, it seems that Martini rejected the two-contract model and acknowledged only the contract of submission as binding. Martini sought to hold the middle ground between Machiavellians arguing that the subjects lose all rights after the social contract, and radical ‘monarchomachs’ who believe that the ‘populus’ retains the supreme power. Martini argues that the ruler is limited by natural laws; the subjects retain rights to life and to property, but they are denied any right to resistance. Since Martini derived the monarch’s powers from the unlimited duty to guarantee security, he admitted even encroachments on religious freedom. He admitted coercion in matters that would threaten salus civitatis, but respected the inner libertas conscientiae. He also acknowledged a peculiar division of powers differentiating between a legislative, an inspectorial and an executive power. Even though the aim of this division was not a system of checks and balances, a precise description of the scope of the executive power helped to delimit a sphere of individual freedom.
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| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
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Carl Anton Martini and Natural Law at the University of Vienna after 1752
In: GrotianaSearch for other papers by Ivo Cerman in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
Natural law as a discipline was definitively institutionalized at universities in the Habsburg monarchy during the reforms of Maria Theresia after 1752. The guiding principles of these reforms were set in the instruction for the chair of natural law in Vienna which was given to Carl Anton Martini. It was Catholic in conception, but it ordered the professor to draw on Grotius. Our article reconstructs the elementary structure of Martini’s theory of natural law with a focus on his conception of state. The article proves that Martini did not adopt Wolff’s conception of deducing duties and obligations from the highest principle for that would conflict with the Catholic emphasis on freedom of will. Instead of that, Martini derived duties and rights from the three God-given ends. Martini perceived the state as based on social contract, after the model of Christian Wolff. However, it seems that Martini rejected the two-contract model and acknowledged only the contract of submission as binding. Martini sought to hold the middle ground between Machiavellians arguing that the subjects lose all rights after the social contract, and radical ‘monarchomachs’ who believe that the ‘populus’ retains the supreme power. Martini argues that the ruler is limited by natural laws; the subjects retain rights to life and to property, but they are denied any right to resistance. Since Martini derived the monarch’s powers from the unlimited duty to guarantee security, he admitted even encroachments on religious freedom. He admitted coercion in matters that would threaten salus civitatis, but respected the inner libertas conscientiae. He also acknowledged a peculiar division of powers differentiating between a legislative, an inspectorial and an executive power. Even though the aim of this division was not a system of checks and balances, a precise description of the scope of the executive power helped to delimit a sphere of individual freedom.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 74 | 74 | 22 |
| Full Text Views | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 33 | 33 | 25 |