This essay challenges the analogy argument. The analogy argument aims to show that the international domain satisfies the conditions of a Hobbesian state of nature: There fails to be a super-sovereign to keep all in awe, and hence, like persons in the state of nature, sovereigns are in a war every sovereign against every sovereign. By turning to Hobbes’ account of authorization, however, we see that subjects are under no obligation to obey a sovereign’s commands when doing so would contradict the very end that motivated the authorization of the sovereign in the first place. There is thus an important disanalogy between natural and artificial persons, and this accordingly produces different reactions to the state of nature.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
Arendt H.The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1994.
Beitz C. R.PoliticalTheory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.
Buchanan A. E.Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Bull H.The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. 3 ed. London: Palgrave, 1977.
———. “Hobbes and the International Anarchy.” Social Research 47 (1981): 717–38.
Donnelly J., “The Ethics of Realism.” In The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, edited by Reus-Smit C., and Snidal D., 444–61. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
———. Realism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Doyle M. W.Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997.
Flathman R. E.ThomasHobbes: Skepticism, Individuality, and Chastened Politics. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000.
Forsyth M. “Thomas Hobbes and the External Relations of States.” British Journal of International Relations 5 (1979): 196–209.
Gauthier D. P.TheLogic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.
Gert B.Hobbes: Prince of Peace. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010.
Hanson D. W. “Thomas Hobbes’s ‘Highway to Peace.’.” International Organization 38 (1984): 329–54.
Hart H. L. A. “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals.” Harvard Law Review 71 (1958): 593–629.
Hobbes T.A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.
Hoffmann S.The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics. 2 ed. London: Praeger, 1965.
Holmes R. L.OnWar and Morality. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
Kavka G. “Hobbes’s War of All against All.” Ethics 93, no. 2 (1983): 291–310.
King P. T.ThomasHobbes: Politics and Law. New York: Taylor & Francis, 1993.
Kratochwil F., “Sociological Approaches.” In The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, edited by Reus-Smit Christian, and Snidal Duncan, 444–61. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Lloyd S. A.Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes: Cases in the Law of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Lott T. L., “Hobbes on International Relations.” In War among Nations, edited by Airaksinen T., and Bertman M. A., 571–79. Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company, 1989.
Malcom N.Aspects of Hobbes. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.
Martinich A. P.Hobbes. New York: Routledge, 2005.
May L.Limiting Leviathan: Hobbes on Law and International Affairs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Meinecke F.Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison D’état and Its Place in Modern History. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1957.
Morgenthau H. J.Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 6th ed. New York: Knopf, 1985.
Newey G.Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hobbes and Leviathan. New York: Routledge, 2008.
Patapan H., “The Glorious Sovereign: Thomas Hobbes on Leadership and International Relations.” In British International Thinkers from Hobbes to Namier, edited by Hall I., and Hill L., 11–32. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
Pettit P.Made with Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Prokhovnik R., “Hobbes, Sovereignty, and Politics: Rethinking International Political Space.” In International Political Theory after Hobbes: Analysis, Interpretation and Orientation, edited by Prokhovnik R., and Slomp G., 189–212. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
———. “Hobbes’s Artifice as Social Construction.” Hobbes Studies 18, no. 1 (2005): 74–95.
Prokhovnik Raia, , and Slomp Gabriella, eds. International Political Theory after Hobbes: Analysis, Interpretation and Orientation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
Quine W. V. O. “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes.” the Journal of Philosophy 53, no. 5 (1956): 177–87.
Rawls J.Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007.
Skinner Q.Visions of Politics: Hobbes and Civil Science. Vol. 3, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Slomp G., “The Politics of Motion and the Motion of Politics.” In International Political Theory after Hobbes: Analysis, Interpretation and Orientation, edited by Prokhovnik R., and Slomp G., 19–41. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
Smith M.Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986.
Sorell T. “Hobbes on Trade, Consumption and International Order.” The Monist 89, no. 2 (2006): 245–58.
———. “Hobbes, Public Safety and Political Economy.” In International Political Theory after Hobbes: Analysis, Interpretation and Orientation, edited by Prokhovnik R., and Slomp G.. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
Walker R. B. J., “Hobbes, Origins, Limits.” In International Political Theory after Hobbes: Analysis, Interpretation and Orientation, edited by Prokhovnik R., and Slomp G., 168–88. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
Waltz K. N.Theory of International Politics. 1st ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979.
Walzer M.Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. 4th ed. New York: Basic Books, 2006.
Warrender J. H.The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957.
Wendt A.Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Williams M. C.The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
———. “Recasting the Hobbesian Legacy in International Political Theory.” In International Political Theory after Hobbes: Analysis, Interpretation and Orientation, edited by Prokhovnik R., and Slomp G.. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
R. Prokhovnik and G. Slomp, eds., International Political Theory after Hobbes: Analysis, Interpretation and Orientation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 13fn1. The standard account of historical realism in international relations textbooks often begins by mentioning Thucydides and Machiavelli but primarily focuses on Hobbes. Sutch and Elias (2007, 45–46) and Steans et al (2010, 56–57) are good examples.
M. Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 13.
M. W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 116.
G. Newey, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hobbes and Leviathan (New York: Routledge, 2008), 172.
See Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 32; Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics, 65; Newey, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hobbes and Leviathan, 161; M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 4. Hannah Arendt, for example, criticizes this picture of Hobbesian international relations arguing that it serves as a justification for aggressive imperialism, see H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1994), 142–45.
See J. Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 30; Newey, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hobbes and Leviathan, 168.
B. Gert, Hobbes: Prince of Peace (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 132.
L. May, Limiting Leviathan: Hobbes on Law and International Affairs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 161.
P. T. King, Thomas Hobbes: Politics and Law (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1993), 449.
See also Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, 102; Gert, Hobbes: Prince of Peace, 132.
S. A. Lloyd, Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes: Cases in the Law of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 29; Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, 40–41. A subject could of course perform acts that conflicted with the end that motivated the formation of the sovereign – e.g. fight in a dangerous war. However, performing such acts would be for her own reasons and not because of an obligation to the sovereign. I thank an anonymous referee for urging me to clarify this point.
See Flathman, Thomas Hobbes: Skepticism, Individuality, and Chastened Politics, 110; H. Patapan, "The Glorious Sovereign: Thomas Hobbes on Leadership and International Relations," in British International Thinkers from Hobbes to Namier, ed. I. Hall and L. Hill (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 15; Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, 42–43.
Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation, 119.
Hobbes, A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England, 57.
See also Lloyd, Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes: Cases in the Law of Nature, 35; Malcom, Aspects of Hobbes, 448.
Hobbes, A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England, 159.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 337 | 63 | 24 |
Full Text Views | 246 | 5 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 65 | 8 | 1 |
This essay challenges the analogy argument. The analogy argument aims to show that the international domain satisfies the conditions of a Hobbesian state of nature: There fails to be a super-sovereign to keep all in awe, and hence, like persons in the state of nature, sovereigns are in a war every sovereign against every sovereign. By turning to Hobbes’ account of authorization, however, we see that subjects are under no obligation to obey a sovereign’s commands when doing so would contradict the very end that motivated the authorization of the sovereign in the first place. There is thus an important disanalogy between natural and artificial persons, and this accordingly produces different reactions to the state of nature.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 337 | 63 | 24 |
Full Text Views | 246 | 5 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 65 | 8 | 1 |