Hobbes’s Reply to the Fool and the Prudence of Self-Binding

In: Hobbes Studies

Few passages in Hobbes’s writings have generated as much critical interest as the notorious reply to the fool – one who believes it is reasonable to renege on our promises whenever it is advantageous for us to do so. In his reply, Hobbes appears to argue that it is never reasonable to renege on our promises because doing so is never in our prudential interest. The problem is not only that this reply seems wrong, but further that it seems inconsistent with Hobbes’s own philosophical commitments. This research note argues that the reply makes sense if we are willing to read it as an incompletely worked-out claim about the prudence of sometimes preventing oneself from being fully prudent in the future.

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 64 64 10
Full Text Views 21 21 8
PDF Downloads 11 11 3