Pyrrhonian inquiry responds to the hope of intellectual tranquillity, and aims at the achievement and maintenance of said tranquillity. According to the Tranquillity Charge, philosophical inquiry aims at the truth; hence, insofar as Pyrrhonian inquiry aims at tranquillity, it does not qualify as philosophical inquiry. Furthermore, Pyrrhonian philanthropy rests on the Partisan Premise, i.e. the claim that all philosophers aim at the removal of psychological disturbance. I show that the origin-story of Pyrrhonism evades the Tranquillity Charge, and that the Partisan Premise is not as partisan as it seems. Unlike previous attempts, my reconstruction preserves all tranquillity-related features of Sextan Pyrrhonism.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
[Galen.] Philosophos Historia. In: Doxographi Graeci. Diels, H. (ed.), 1879, Berlin.
Sextus Empiricus. Against the Ethicists. Bett, R. (tr.), 1997. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Sextus Empiricus. Against the Grammarians (Adversus Mathematicos I). Blank, D. (tr.), 1998. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
[Sextus Empiricus.] Des Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoneïsche Grundzüge. Pappenheim, E. (tr.), 1877. Leipzig: Meiner.
Sextus Empiricus. Esquisses pyrrhoniennes. Pellegrin (tr.), 1997. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
Sextus Empiricus. Grundriß der pyrrhonischen Skepsis. Hossenfelder, M. (tr.), 1968. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
[Sextus Empiricus.] Oeuvres choisies de Sextus Empiricus. Contre les physiciens. Contre les moralistes. Hypotyposes pyrrhoniennes. Grenier, J. & Goron, G. (eds., trs.), 1948. Paris: Aubier Éditions Montaigne.
Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Bury, R.G. (tr.), 1933. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[Sextus Empiricus.] Sesto Empirico, Schizzi pirroniani. Tescari, O. & Russo, A. (trs.), 1999. Milan: Lampi di Stampa.
[Sextus Empiricus.] Sexti Empirici Opera, vol. 1. ΠΥΡΡΩΝΕΙΩΝ ΥΠΟΤΥΠΩΣΕΩΝ. Mutschmann, H. (ed.), 1912. Leipzig: Teubner. (= PH)
[Sextus Empiricus.] Sexti Empirici Opera, vol. 2. Adversus Dogmaticos libros quinque (Adv. Mathem. VII–XI) continens. Mutschmann, H. (ed.), 1914. Leipzig: Teubner. (= M VII–XI)
[Sextus Empiricus.] Sexti Empirici Opera, vol. 3. Adversus Mathematicos libros I–VI continens. Mutschmann, H. & Mau, J. (eds.), 1954. Leipzig: Teubner, 1954. (= M I–VI)
Annas, J. 1986. Doing without objective values: Ancient and modern strategies. In: Schofield, M. & Striker, G. (eds.), The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 3–29.
Annas, J. 1992. Plato the Sceptic. In: Annas, J., Klagge, J. & Smith, N. (eds.), Methods of Interpreting Plato and his Dialogues. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 1992. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 43–72.
Annas, J. 1993. The Morality of Happiness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Annas, J. & Barnes, J. (eds., trs.) 2000. Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bailey, A. 2002. Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Barnes, J. 2000. Introduction. In: Annas & Barnes (eds., trs.), Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, xi–xxxi.
Barnes, J. 2007. Sextan Scepticism. In: Scott, D. (ed.), Maieusis: Essays on Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 322–334.
Barney, R. 1992. Appearances and impressions. Phronesis 37(3), 283–313.
Barney, R. (forthcoming). Giving up and going on: Sextus, Socrates, Apelles, and the Sceptical search for truth.
Bett, R. 2000. Pyrrho, his Antecedents, and his Legacy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bett, R. 2010. Scepticism and ethics. In Bett, R. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 188–194.
Bett, R. 2012. Can an ancient Greek Sceptic be eudaimōn (or happy)? And what difference does the answer make to us?’ Journal of Ancient Philosophy 6(1), 1–26.
Bett, R. 2013. The Pyrrhonist’s dilemma: What to write when you have nothing to say. In: Erler, M. & Hessler, J.E. (eds.) Argument und literarische Form in antiker Philosophie. Berlin: De Gruyter, 389–410.
Brennan, T. 1999. Ethics and Epistemology in Sextus Empiricus. London: Routledge.
Brennan, T. 2013. Critical notice: Casey Perin’s The Demands of Reason. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3, 283–293.
Brennan, T. & Roberts, C. 2018. Sextus Empiricus. In: Machuca, D.E. & Reed, B. (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to Present. London: Bloomsbury, 125–144.
Brochard, V. 2002. Les sceptiques grecs. Paris: Le Livre de Poche.
Brunschwig, J. 2006. Pyrrhonism. In: Gill, M.L. & Pellegrin, P. (eds.), A Companion to Ancient Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 465–485.
Burnyeat, M.F. & Frede, M. (eds). 1997. The Original Sceptics: A Controversy. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Castagnoli, L. 2018. Aporia and enquiry in ancient Pyrrhonism. In: Karamanolis, G. & Politis, V. (eds.), The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 205–227.
Cooper, J.M. 2012. Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy from Socrates to Plotinus. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
de Olaso, E. 1988. Zetesis. Manuscrito 11(2), 7–32.
Eichorn, R. 2014. How (Not) to Read Sextus Empiricus. Ancient Philosophy 34, 121–149.
Fine, G. 2000. ‘Sceptical dogmata: Outlines of Pyrrhonism I 13. Méthexis 13, 81–105.
Fine, G. 2014. The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno’s Paradox from Socrates to Sextus. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Flückiger, H. 1990. Sextus Empiricus, Grundriss der pyrrhonischen Skepsis, Buch I, Selektiver Kommentar. Flückiger (trs.). Bern—Stuttgart: Paul Haupt.
Flückiger, H. 1994. Der Weg zum Glück in der pyrrhonischen Skepsis und im griechischen Roman: Die Beobachtung des βίος gegen die Erkenntnis der Philosophen. Museum Helveticum 51(4), 198–205.
Frede, M. 2004. Aristotle’s account of the origins of philosophy. Rhizai 1, 9–44.
Frede, M. (forthcoming). Sextus Empiricus on the origin of philosophy. In: Essays on Hellenistic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, = Frede, M. 2008. Ο Σέξτος Εµπειρικός για τις απαρχές της φιλοσοφίας. In: Balla, C. (ed.), A. Tigani (tr.), Η αρχαία ελληνική φιλοσοφία: Όψεις της ιστορίας και της ιστοριογραφίας της, 131–158. Ekkremes Press: Athens.
Grgić, F. 2006. Sextus Empiricus on the goal of Skepticism. Ancient Philosophy 26, 141–160.
Grgić, F. 2008. Sextus Empiricus on the possibility of inquiry. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89(4), 436–459.
Grgić, F. 2012. Investigative and suspensive Scepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 22(4), 653–673.
Hallie, P.P. & Etheridge, S.G. (eds.) 1964. Scepticism, Man and God. Selections from the Major Writings of Sextus Empiricus. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.
Hankinson, R.J. 1997. The end of Scepticism. Kriterion 96, 7–32.
Hiley, D.R. 1987. The Deep Challenge of Pyrrhonian Scepticism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 25(2), 185–213.
Ioli, R. 2003. Agōgē and related concepts in Sextus Empiricus. Siculorum Gymnasium 56(2), 401–428.
Irwin, T. 2007. The Development of Ethics. A Historical and Critical Study. Volume 1: From Socrates to the Reformation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Janáček, K. 1972. Sextus Empiricus’ Sceptical Methods. Prague: Universita Karlova Praha.
Loeb, L.E. 1998. Sextus, Descartes, Hume, and Peirce: On securing settled doxastic states. Noûs 32(2), 205–230.
Long, A.A. 2006. Aristotle and the history of Greek Skepticism. In Long, A.A. (ed.), From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 43–69.
Machuca, D.E. 2006. The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία. Ancient Philosophy 26, 111–139.
Machuca, D.E. 2009. Argumentative persuasiveness in ancient Pyrrhonism. Méthexis 22, 101–126.
Machuca, D.E. 2011a. The Pyrrhonian argument from possible disagreement. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93, 148–161.
Machuca, D.E. 2011b. Moderate ethical realism in Sextus’ Against the Ethicists? In Machuca, D. (ed.), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 143–178.
Machuca, D.E. 2017. Again on Sextus on persuasiveness and equipollence. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 99(2), 212–228.
Marchand, S. 2010. Le sceptique cherche-t-il vraiment la vérité? Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 65, 125–141.
Maconi, H. 1988. Nova Non Philosophandi Philosophia: A review of Anna Maria Ioppolo, Opinione e Scienza. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 6, 231–253.
Mates, B. (ed.). 1996. The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism. New York—Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McPherran, M.L. 1987. Skeptical homeopathy and self-refutation. Phronesis 32(3), 290–328.
McPherran, M.L. 1989. Ataraxia and eudaimonia in ancient Pyrrhonism: Is the skeptic really happy?. Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 5, 135–171.
McPherran, M.L. 1990. Pyrrhonism’s arguments against value. Philosophical Studies 60(1–2), 127–142.
Menn, S. 2013. Plato’s soteriology? In Adluri, V. (ed.), Philosophy and Salvation in Greek Religion, 191–216. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter.
Moller, D. 2004. The Pyrrhonian Skeptic’s telos. Ancient Philosophy 24(2), 425–441.
Morrison, D. 1990. The ancient Sceptic’s way of life. Metaphilosophy 21(3), 204–222.
Nussbaum, M.C. 1994. Skeptic purgatives: Disturbance and the life without belief. In Nussbaum, M.C. (ed.), The Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, 280–315. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Olfert, C.M.M. 2015. Skeptical investigation and its perks: Diog. Laert. 9.69–70 and 79–89. In: Vogt, K.M. (ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius: Introduction, Text, Translation, Commentary and Interpretative Essays. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 147–170.
Palmer, J.A. 2000. Sceptical investigation. Ancient Philosophy 20(2), 351–375.
Perin, C. 2010a. The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Perin, C. 2010b. Scepticism and belief. In Bett, R. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 45–64.
Perin, C. 2014. Scepticism, truth, and value. A reply to Brennan. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4(1), 51–62.
Pohlenz, M. 1904. Das Lebensziel des Skeptiker. Hermes 39(1), 15–29.
Polito, R. 2007. Was Skepticism a philosophy? Reception, self-definition, internal conflicts. Classical Philology 102(4), 333–362.
Ryan, G.E. 1990. Commentary on McPherran 1990. Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 5, 172–180.
Schwab, W. 2013. Skepticism, belief, and the criterion of truth. Apeiron 46(3), 327–344.
Sedley, D. 1983. The motivation of Greek Skepticism. In Burnyeat, M.F. (ed.), The Skeptical Tradition. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 9–29.
Striker, G. 1990. Ataraxia: Happiness as tranquillity. The Monist 73(1), 97–110.
Striker, G. 2001. Scepticism as a kind of philosophy. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83(2), 113–129.
Svavarsson, S.H. 2011. Two kinds of tranquillity: Sextus Empiricus on ataraxia. In: Machuca, D.E. (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer, 19–31.
Svavarsson, S.H. 2014a. The Sceptic’s luck: on fortuitous tranquillity. In: Emilsson, E.K., Maravela, A. & Skoie, M. (eds.)m Paradeigmata: Studies in Honour of Øivind Andersen. Athens: Norwegian Institute in Athens, 177–184.
Svavarsson, S.H. 2014b. Sextus Empiricus on persuasiveness and equipollence. In: Lee, M.-K. (ed.), Strategies of Argument: Essays in Ancient Ethics, Epistemology, and Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 356–373.
Svavarsson, S.H. 2015. The Pyrrhonian idea of a good life. In: Rabbås, Ø., Emilsson, E.K., Fossheim, H. & Tuominen, M. (eds.), The Quest for the Good Life: Ancient Philosophers on Happiness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 197–211.
Voelke, A.-J. 1990. Soigner par le logos: La thérapeutique de Sextus Empiricus. In Voelke, A.J. (ed.), Le Scepticisme antique: perspectives historiques et systématiques, Actes du colloque de Lausanne, 1–3 juin 1988. Geneva / Lausanne / Neuchâtel: Cahiers de la Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie, 181–194.
Vogt, K.M. 2012. Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Warren, J. 2002. Epicurus and Democritean Ethics: An Archaeology of Ataraxia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 635 | 72 | 6 |
Full Text Views | 29 | 11 | 2 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 74 | 23 | 4 |
Pyrrhonian inquiry responds to the hope of intellectual tranquillity, and aims at the achievement and maintenance of said tranquillity. According to the Tranquillity Charge, philosophical inquiry aims at the truth; hence, insofar as Pyrrhonian inquiry aims at tranquillity, it does not qualify as philosophical inquiry. Furthermore, Pyrrhonian philanthropy rests on the Partisan Premise, i.e. the claim that all philosophers aim at the removal of psychological disturbance. I show that the origin-story of Pyrrhonism evades the Tranquillity Charge, and that the Partisan Premise is not as partisan as it seems. Unlike previous attempts, my reconstruction preserves all tranquillity-related features of Sextan Pyrrhonism.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 635 | 72 | 6 |
Full Text Views | 29 | 11 | 2 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 74 | 23 | 4 |