Concept Negation in Kant
In: History of Philosophy & Logical AnalysisSearch for other papers by Mark Siebel in
Current site
Google Scholar
Abstract
Kant distinguishes concept negation from copula negation. While the latter results in a negative judgement, i.e. a judgement denying a property of certain objects, the former gives rise to a negative concept, such as ‘immortal’. Since Kant’s remarks on concept negation are scattered and inconclusive, five interpretations are worked out and put to the test: logical negation, pseudo-negation, attribution of a zero degree, possibility-restricted negation and genus-restricted negation. Whereas the first four interpretations fail for a number of reasons, genus-restricted negation turns out to be tenable.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
-
Crusius, C. A. 1747. Weg zur Gewißheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntniß. Leipzig: Johann Friedrich Gleditsch.
-
Kant, I. Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften (Akademieausgabe). Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1900ff. Berlin: Reimer, since 1922 de Gruyter. (= AA)
-
Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason. Guyer, P. & Wood, A. W. (eds., trs.), 1998. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (= CPR)
-
Kant, I. Lectures on Logic. Young, J. M. (ed., tr.), 1992. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (= LL)
-
Kant, I. Lectures on Metaphysics. Ameriks, K. & Naragon, S. (eds., trs.), 1997. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (= LM)
-
Kant, I. Notes and Fragments. Guyer, P. (ed.), Bowman, C. & Rauscher, F. (trs.), 2005. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (= NF)
-
Kant, I. Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770. Walford, D. (ed., tr.), 1992. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (= TP1)
-
Kant, I. Theoretical Philosophy after 1781. Allison H. & Heath, P. (eds.), Hatfield G. & Friedman, M. (trs.), 2002. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (= TP2)
-
Meier, G. F. 1752a. Vernunftlehre. Halle: Johann Justinus Gebauer.
-
Meier, G. F. 1752b. Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre. Halle: Johann Justinus Gebauer.
-
Reimarus, H. S. 1766. Die Vernunftlehre. 3rd edition. Hamburg: Johann Carl Bohn.
-
Ulrich, J. A. H. 1772. Erster Umriß einer Anleitung zu den philosophischen Wissenschaften. Jena: Christian Friedrich Gollner.
-
Aebi, M. 1947. Kants Begründung der “Deutschen Philosophie”. Kants transzendentale Logik. Kritik ihrer Begründung. Hildesheim / Zürich / New York: Georg Olms.
-
Anderson, R. L. 2004. It Adds Up After All: Kant’s Philosophy of Arithmetic in Light of the Traditional Logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69(3), 501–540.
-
Anderson, R. L. 2005. The Wolffian Paradigm and its Discontents: Kant’s Containment Definition of Analyticity in Historical Context. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 87(1), 22–74.
-
Bennett, J. 1966. Kant’s Analytic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-
Bennett, J. 1974. Kant’s Dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-
Berg, J. 2014. Die theoretische Philosophie Kants. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.
-
Bolzano, B. 1810. Allgemeine Mathesis. Berg, J. (ed.), 1977. Bernard-Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe, II A 5. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.
-
Bolzano, B. 1851. Paradoxien des Unendlichen. Leipzig: C. H. Reclam. Republ. C. Tapp (ed.), 2012. Hamburg: Meiner.
-
de Jong, W. R. 1995. Kant’s Analytic Judgments and the Traditional Theory of Concepts. Journal of the History of Philosophy 33(4), 613–641.
-
Feder, J. G. H. 1783. Logik und Metaphysik. 3rd edition. Wien: Johann Thomas Edler von Trattner.
-
Fichte, G. 1794/1795. Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre. Jena: Gabler
-
Flage, D. E. & Bonnen C. A. 1999. Descartes and Method: A Search for a Method in Meditations. London: Routledge.
-
Guyer, P. 2006. Kant. New York: Routledge.
-
Hanna, R. 2011. Kant’s Theory of Judgment. In: Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition). URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/kant-judgment>.
-
Hegel, G. W. F. 1816. Wissenschaft der Logik 2. Moldenhauer, E. & Michel, K. M. (eds.), 1979. Werke [in 20 Bänden und Register; auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832–1845 neu edierte Ausgabe]. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
-
Ishikawa, F. 1990. Kants Denken von einem Dritten. Frankfurt a. M. / Bern / New York / Paris: Peter Lang.
-
Jankowiak, T. 2013. Kant’s Argument for the Principle of Intensive Magnitudes. Kantian Review 18(3), 387–412.
-
Joël, K. 1922. Das logische Recht der Kantischen Tafel der Urteile. Kant-Studien 27(1–2), 298–327.
-
Keller, J. 1876. Zur Geschichte und Kritik des unendlichen Urteils. Appendix to: Jahres- Bericht über das Grossherzogliche Gymnasium in Konstanz vom Schuljahre 1875–76. Konstanz: Friedrich Stadtler.
-
Kemp Smith, N. 1918. A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. London: Macmillan.
-
Laiho, H. 2016. Kant on Representing Negative States of Affairs. Topoi. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245–016–9386-z.
-
Lambert, J. H. 1771. Anlage zur Architectonic, Erster Band. Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch.
-
Lotze, H. 1874. System der Philosophie. Leipzig: S. Hirzel.
-
Loux, M. J. 1974. Ockham’s Theory of Terms: Part 1 of the Summa Logicae. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
-
Malzkorn, W. 2001. Analytical and Dialectical Oppositions Reconsidered: New Perpectives on Kant’s Antinomies. In: Volker, G., Horstmann, R.-P. & Schumacher, R. (eds.), Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Bd. V: Sektionen XV – XVIII. Berlin: De Gruyter, 37–44.
-
Menne, A. 1982. Das unendliche Urteil Kants. Philosophia Naturalis 19(1–2), 151–162.
-
Mion, G. 2014. The Square of Opposition: From Russell’s Logic to Kant’s Cosmology. History and Philosophy of Logic 35(4), 377–382.
-
Neuhaus F. & Scheffler, U. 2001. Alter Wein frisch abgefüllt. Explikation und Expansion von “Analytizität”. In: Volker, G., Horstmann, R.-P. & Schumacher, R. (eds.), Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Bd. V: Sektionen XV–XVIII. Berlin: De Gruyter, 45–54.
-
Orenstein, A. 1978. Existence and the Particular Quantifier. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
-
Orenstein, A. 1999. Reconciling Kant and Frege. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40(3), 391–413.
-
Orenstein, A. 2000. The Logical Form of Categorical Sentences. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78(4), 517–533.
-
Orenstein, A. 2002. Existence, Identity and an Aristotelian Tradition. In: Bottani, A., Carrara, M. & Giaretta, P. (eds.), Individuals, Essence and Identity: Themes of Analytic Metaphysics. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 127–149.
-
Peirce, C. S. 1902. Limitative. In: Baldwin J. M. (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. 2. New York: Macmillan, 6–7.
-
Rohs, P. 1978. Kants Prinzip der durchgängigen Bestimmung alles Seienden. Kant-Studien 69(1–4), 170–180.
-
Schopenhauer, A. 1818. Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Zürcher Ausgabe. Werke in zehn Bänden, Band 2. 1977. Zürich: Diogenes.
-
Schwarz, W. 1987. Kant’s Categories of Reality and Existence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48(2), 343–346.
-
Siebel, M. 2011. ‘It Falls Somewhat Short of Logical Precision’. Bolzano on Kant’s Definition of Analytic Judgements. Grazer Philosophische Studien 82(1), 91–127.
-
Siebel, M. 2014. Ayers Kritik an Kants Definition analytischer Urteile. Kant-Studien 105(2) 196–220.
-
Siebel, M. 2016. Kant on Infinite and Negative Judgements: Three Interpretations, Six Tests, No Clear Result. Topoi. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245–017–9476–6.
-
Stang, N. F. 2012. Kant on Complete Determination and Infinite Judgement. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20(6), 1117–1139.
-
Strobach, N. 2001. Qualifizierte Negation als Schlüssel zum Verständnis der 1. Antinomie in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. In: Volker, G., Horstmann, R.-P. & Schumacher, R. (eds.), Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Bd. V: Sektionen XV – XVIII. Berlin: De Gruyter, 94–105.
-
Thompson, M. 1953. On Aristotle’s Square of Opposition. Philosophical Review 62(2), 251–265.
-
Tonelli, G. 1966. Die Voraussetzungen zur Kantischen Urteilstafel in der Logik des 18. Jahrhunderts. In: Kaulbach, F. & Ritter, J. (eds.), Kritik und Metaphysik. Berlin: De Gruyter, 134–158.
-
Van Cleve, J. 1981. Reflections on Kant’s Second Antinomy. Synthese 47(3), 481–494.
-
Vanzo, A. 2014. Kant on Existential Import. Kantian Review 19(2), 207–232.
-
Wiggins, D. 1994. The Kant-Frege-Russell View of Existence: Toward the Rehabilitation of the Second-Level View. In: Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (ed.), Modality, Morality, and Belief. Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 93–113.
-
Wolff, M. 1995. Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann.
-
Wolfson, H. A. 1947. Infinite and Privative Judgments in Aristotle, Averroes, and Kant. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8(2), 173–187.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 652 | 198 | 25 |
| Full Text Views | 27 | 10 | 1 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 79 | 27 | 3 |
Concept Negation in Kant
In: History of Philosophy & Logical AnalysisSearch for other papers by Mark Siebel in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
Kant distinguishes concept negation from copula negation. While the latter results in a negative judgement, i.e. a judgement denying a property of certain objects, the former gives rise to a negative concept, such as ‘immortal’. Since Kant’s remarks on concept negation are scattered and inconclusive, five interpretations are worked out and put to the test: logical negation, pseudo-negation, attribution of a zero degree, possibility-restricted negation and genus-restricted negation. Whereas the first four interpretations fail for a number of reasons, genus-restricted negation turns out to be tenable.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 652 | 198 | 25 |
| Full Text Views | 27 | 10 | 1 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 79 | 27 | 3 |