On the Formal Validity of Proof by Contradiction in Kant’s Logic

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Davide Dalla Rosa Department of Philosophy, Sociology, Pedagogy and Applied Psychology (FISPPA), University of Padua Padua Italy

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The paper provides a reconstruction of proof by contradiction in Kant’s pure general logic. A seemingly less-explored point of view on this topic is how apagogical proof can account for the formal truth of a judgement. Integrating the argument held by Kjosavik (2019), I intend to highlight how one can use proof by contradiction, conceived as a modus tollens, to establish the logical actuality (logical or formal truth) of a cognition. Although one might agree on the capacity of the proof to prove formal falsity, the logical actuality of a judgement is assessable based on a logically grounded judgement and, as for transcendental logic, this cognitive operation has to presuppose the real possibility of an object.

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