On the Formal Validity of Proof by Contradiction in Kant’s Logic
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Abstract
The paper provides a reconstruction of proof by contradiction in Kant’s pure general logic. A seemingly less-explored point of view on this topic is how apagogical proof can account for the formal truth of a judgement. Integrating the argument held by Kjosavik (2019), I intend to highlight how one can use proof by contradiction, conceived as a modus tollens, to establish the logical actuality (logical or formal truth) of a cognition. Although one might agree on the capacity of the proof to prove formal falsity, the logical actuality of a judgement is assessable based on a logically grounded judgement and, as for transcendental logic, this cognitive operation has to presuppose the real possibility of an object.
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| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 224 | 107 | 7 |
| Full Text Views | 8 | 3 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 28 | 9 | 0 |
On the Formal Validity of Proof by Contradiction in Kant’s Logic
In: History of Philosophy & Logical AnalysisSearch for other papers by Davide Dalla Rosa in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
The paper provides a reconstruction of proof by contradiction in Kant’s pure general logic. A seemingly less-explored point of view on this topic is how apagogical proof can account for the formal truth of a judgement. Integrating the argument held by Kjosavik (2019), I intend to highlight how one can use proof by contradiction, conceived as a modus tollens, to establish the logical actuality (logical or formal truth) of a cognition. Although one might agree on the capacity of the proof to prove formal falsity, the logical actuality of a judgement is assessable based on a logically grounded judgement and, as for transcendental logic, this cognitive operation has to presuppose the real possibility of an object.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 224 | 107 | 7 |
| Full Text Views | 8 | 3 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 28 | 9 | 0 |