The establishment of the hybrid tribunals in Sierra Leone, Cambodia and Lebanon reflected the dissatisfaction of the international community with the criminal tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. It also represented the attempt to find new models of criminal accountability which could shorten the duration of judicial proceedings, and ensure greater impact on the local societies and greater financial efficiency. This article will provide an overview of how states’ opposition to the ICTs model shaped the decision making process on the final financial and administrative arrangements of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. It will also highlight the particular financial and administrative features of each of these institutions. Finally, the article will review the financial support received by the hybrid tribunals so far and the specific measures adopted to address recurring funding shortages.
In May2004because of arrears in payments by member states a temporary freeze on external recruitment was imposed on the ICTY and ICTR for a year. At that time the Tribunals were also requested to reduce non-post expenditures.
In June1996the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 213 (A/RES/50/213) requesting OIOS to review the functioning of the ICTR identify problems and recommend measures to enhance the efficient use of resources. The Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) on the audit and investigation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (A/51/789) p. 2 found that: In the Tribunal’s Registry not a single administrative area functioned effectively: Finance had no accounting system and could not produce allotment reports so that neither the Registry nor United Nations Headquarters had budget expenditure information; lines of authority were not clearly defined; internal controls were weak in all sections; personnel in key positions did not have the required qualifications; there was no property management system; procurement actions largely deviated from United Nations procedures; United Nations regulations and rules were widely disregarded; the Kigali office did not get the administrative support needed and construction work for the second courtroom had not even started.Similarly the Annual report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) for the Period 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1996 (A/51/432) para. 78 states that “[a] comprehensive audit of the ICTY showed that it took approximately 18 months […] before the Tribunal became operational” and identifies a number of areas where more efficient arrangements could have been made. See also subsequent reports including Annual Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) for the period 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997 (A/52/426) and Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of OIOS 1 July 2004 - 30 June 2004 (A/59/331).
In1999for example having received the ACABQ report on Revised for 1998 and proposed requirements for 1999 of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (A/53/651) suggesting a review of the management and organizational strategy of the organs of the ICTY the General Assembly adopted Resolution 651 (A/53/651) requesting the Secretary-General to appoint a panel of independent experts to evaluate the effectiveness of the operation and functioning of the ICTY and the ICTR with the objective of ensuring the effective use of resources of the tribunals. The Report (A/54/634) made several recommendations to improve the efficiency of the tribunals.
In2004for example the Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (A/59/359) observes in para. 93 that: […] there was insufficient information to confirm the Tribunal’s contention to the Security Council that the investigation and prosecution mandates of the Office of the Prosecutor would be completed by 2004 and 2008 respectively. There was no coherent documentation of a strategy and not all seem to have been identified that could have an impact on the two Tribunals’ ability to meet their mandate completion dates.
On 23 August2003the Security Council seized the initiative on the matter adopting Resolution 1503 (S/RES/1503) and later Resolution 1534 (S/RES/1534) asking the tribunal that any new indictment concentrate only of the most senior leaders suspected of being responsible for war crimes and requested the ICTY to report twice a year on the implementation of its completion strategy.
On 23 March and 18 June2001.
In November2001the GIS selected as Management Committee members Canada Lesotho the Netherlands Nigeria the United Kingdom and the United States.
On 22 September2011the ECCC Trial Chamber issued a Severance Order pursuant to Internal Rule 88ter suggesting the separation of the proceedings in case 002 into smaller trials starting with a consideration of the allegations of forced transfer of the population and related crimes against humanity. It is estimated that case 002 would comprise four trials. A conservative estimate of one year per trial implies that the completion of case 002 may require at least four to five years from its official opening (in November 2011). Note also that the ECCC 2010-2011 budget approved on 23 February 2010 provided in its Annex A (Indicative Court Schedule) that the Court will continue its work until 2015.
Between March and December2005fourteen attacks were perpetrated in Lebanon (see Third report of the International Independent Investigation Commission established pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 1595 (2005) 1636 (2005) and 1644 (2005)(S/2006/161) para. 55). On 12 December the prominent journalist and member of Parliament Gabran Tueni was killed only a day after returning to Lebanon from Paris where he had moved because of threats to his life.
UN Security Council Resolution1664(S/RES/1664) para. 3.
In2012the Special Tribunal replaced the US Dollar with the Euro as its official currency.