The impact of armed conflict on children has been recognized for some time as a major humanitarian problem. In 1999, the United Nations (UN) Security Council began taking up the abuse of children during armed conflict as a regular thematic issue. As part of the protective framework, the UN adopted a “strategy” of “naming and shaming” government forces and rebel groups recruiting, killing, maiming, raping or other sexual abusing of children during conflict. The philosophical justification of the public exposures is premised on the supposed stigmatic and deterrent effect on named and shamed offenders. However, little analysis has gone into the impact of this UN policy. This paper has the modest aim of assessing the UN’s naming and shaming practice since inception of the policy in 2002. The efficacy of shaming sanctions is contestable. The recent UN annual statistics on the exposed parties do not seem to evince a convincing causal link between of naming and shaming and adherence to international humanitarian law and international human rights law, particularly among armed non-State groups (ANSAs) so far. Naming and shaming represents an antagonistic modus operandi. This paper argues that humanitarian engagement with ANSAs offers a non-confrontational and corrective approach and thus greater promise for compliance and protection of children during armed conflict than naming and shaming.
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Gates and Reich, supra note 3, at 79.
Judgment, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC, Trial Chamber, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 March 2012, para. 820.
See SC Res. 1379, 20 November 2001, para. 16 (‘Requests the Secretary-General to attach to his report a list of parties to armed conflict that recruit or use children in violation of the international obligations applicable to them, in situations that are on the Security Council’s agenda or that may be brought to the attention of the Security Council by the Secretary-General.’).
See SC Res. 1460, 30 January 2003.
SC Res. 1612, 26 July 2005.
See SC Res. 2068, 19 September 2012.
Fox, supra note 2, at 27.
Murdie and Davis, supra note 21.
J. Wright and A. Escriba-Folch, ‘Are Dictators Immune to Human Rights Shaming?’, IBEI Working Papers 25 (2009), at 3-39; V. Schneider, ‘The Global Social Capital of Human Rights Movements: A Case Study on Amnesty International’, in K. Ronit and V. Schneider (eds.), Private Organizations in Global Politics (2000); C. Barry et al., ‘Avoiding the Spotlight: Human Rights Shaming and Foreign Direct Investment’, (in press) International Studies Quarterly (2013).
Chayes and Chayes, supra note 60.
See R. Muhumuza, ‘Congo Warlord Wanted Control of M23’, Associated Press, 28 March 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/rebel-spox-bosco-ntaganda-wanted-control-m23-18828920#.UVxdtVtwbrd (last accessed 23 July 2013).
Bangerter, supra note 81.
Somer, supra note 94.
Somer, supra note 94.
Somer, supra note 94.
Bangerter, supra note 81, at 355.
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The impact of armed conflict on children has been recognized for some time as a major humanitarian problem. In 1999, the United Nations (UN) Security Council began taking up the abuse of children during armed conflict as a regular thematic issue. As part of the protective framework, the UN adopted a “strategy” of “naming and shaming” government forces and rebel groups recruiting, killing, maiming, raping or other sexual abusing of children during conflict. The philosophical justification of the public exposures is premised on the supposed stigmatic and deterrent effect on named and shamed offenders. However, little analysis has gone into the impact of this UN policy. This paper has the modest aim of assessing the UN’s naming and shaming practice since inception of the policy in 2002. The efficacy of shaming sanctions is contestable. The recent UN annual statistics on the exposed parties do not seem to evince a convincing causal link between of naming and shaming and adherence to international humanitarian law and international human rights law, particularly among armed non-State groups (ANSAs) so far. Naming and shaming represents an antagonistic modus operandi. This paper argues that humanitarian engagement with ANSAs offers a non-confrontational and corrective approach and thus greater promise for compliance and protection of children during armed conflict than naming and shaming.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 923 | 158 | 21 |
Full Text Views | 204 | 17 | 3 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 176 | 55 | 9 |