Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? raises important conceptual questions of consociational theory and powersharing mechanisms and tests them against a wide range of regional case studies from Europe, Africa and Asia. The axiomatic, underlying interest for analysis is the question: how can and should culturally divided societies be politically managed, not the least through constitutional arrangements? All of the articles are based on the conceptual distinction of “integration” versus “accomodation” as a follow-up to the Lijphart-Horowitz debate. However, the main achievement of the book is the insight into the necessity to de-construct this conceptual dichotomy and to develop better refinements by bridging the gap between comparative politics and comparative constitutional law. In the end the book thus provides fresh food for thought on how to reconcile consociational theory and powersharing mechanisms with the problems of self-determination disputes usually overlooked by the former concepts.