Cf., e.g., K. Abou El-Fadl, “Islam and Democratic Commitment,” Fordham International Law Journal 27: 4 (2003): 4–71 at 7: “[I]f Muslim jurists considered law derived from a sovereign monarch to be inherently illegitimate and whimsical, what is the legitimacy of a system in which the law is derived from a sovereign, but where the sovereign is made up of the citizens of a Nation? The brunt of the challenge to Islam is: If God is the only sovereign and source of law in Islam, is it meaningful to speak of a democracy within Islam …?” Abou El Fadl goes on to speak in terms that seem to imply a fundamental difference between ascertaining the will of God as opposed to that of the people. What is held to be the “will of the people,” however, is often little more than substantively indeterminate aggregates of air scented by the tendency of the political, economic and socio-cultural haves’ to ignore or misrepresent the will of the have-nots. In this light, one might ask whether state law is any more the actual will of “the people” than it might be the actual will of God? More recently, Sheldon Wolin has stated the matter as follows: “Majority rule, democracy’s power-principle, is fictitious; majorities are artifacts manufactured by money, organization and the media.” See his Politics and Vision: Continuity and Change in Western Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 601.

Cf., e.g., K. Abou El-Fadl, “Islam and Democratic Commitment,” Fordham International Law Journal 27: 4 (2003): 4–71 at 7: “[I]f Muslim jurists considered law derived from a sovereign monarch to be inherently illegitimate and whimsical, what is the legitimacy of a system in which the law is derived from a sovereign, but where the sovereign is made up of the citizens of a Nation? The brunt of the challenge to Islam is: If God is the only sovereign and source of law in Islam, is it meaningful to speak of a democracy within Islam …?” Abou El Fadl goes on to speak in terms that seem to imply a fundamental difference between ascertaining the will of God as opposed to that of the people. What is held to be the “will of the people,” however, is often little more than substantively indeterminate aggregates of air scented by the tendency of the political, economic and socio-cultural haves’ to ignore or misrepresent the will of the have-nots. In this light, one might ask whether state law is any more the actual will of “the people” than it might be the actual will of God? More recently, Sheldon Wolin has stated the matter as follows: “Majority rule, democracy’s power-principle, is fictitious; majorities are artifacts manufactured by money, organization and the media.” See his Politics and Vision: Continuity and Change in Western Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 601.)| false
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See, e.g., A. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 113–24.

See, e.g., A. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 113–24.)| false
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See M.E. Marty, The One and the Many: America’s Struggle for the Common Good (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1997), 63–4. This reference to “cohesive sentiment” was part of Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in the famous Minersville School District v. Gobitis case, involving Jehovah’s Witness children who refused to pronounce the pledge of allegiance in school.

See M.E. Marty, The One and the Many: America’s Struggle for the Common Good (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1997), 63–4. This reference to “cohesive sentiment” was part of Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in the famous Minersville School District v. Gobitis case, involving Jehovah’s Witness children who refused to pronounce the pledge of allegiance in school. )| false
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W.E.B. Du Bois, “The Conservation of Races,” in Negro Social and Political Thought, 1850–1920, ed. E. Brotz (New York: Basic, 1966), 488. DuBois’ essay first appeared in 1897.

W.E.B. Du Bois, “The Conservation of Races,” in Negro Social and Political Thought, 1850–1920, ed. E. Brotz (New York: Basic, 1966), 488. DuBois’ essay first appeared in 1897.)| false
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See, e.g., S.P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), xv–xvii, 59–80; see also S.P. Huntington, “The Erosion of American National Interests,” Foreign Affairs, 76:5 (1997): 28–49 at 33, where he notes that, rather than representing the threat of being pressured to assimilate, coming to America is now seen by many immigrants as the greatest guarantor of their right to remain themselves.

See, e.g., S.P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), xv–xvii, 59–80; see also S.P. Huntington, “The Erosion of American National Interests,” Foreign Affairs, 76:5 (1997): 28–49 at 33, where he notes that, rather than representing the threat of being pressured to assimilate, coming to America is now seen by many immigrants as the greatest guarantor of their right to remain themselves. )| false
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See, e.g., S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the Modern World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 151: “[T]he underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam.” For other views reflecting similar sentiments and a response to them, see, e.g., E. Volokh, “Religious Law (Especially Islamic Law) in American Courts,” Oklahoma Law Review, 66: 3 (2014): 431–58 at 454ff.

See, e.g., S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the Modern World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 151: “[T]he underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam.” For other views reflecting similar sentiments and a response to them, see, e.g., E. Volokh, “Religious Law (Especially Islamic Law) in American Courts,” Oklahoma Law Review, 66: 3 (2014): 431–58 at 454ff.)| false
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For example, in 1982, Islamist newspapers in Egypt (e.g., al-Liwā’ al-Islāmī), Muslim activists and even some Azharī shaykhs were rather strident in condemning birth-control pills, some seeing them as part of a Western conspiracy to limit Muslim populations. When I returned less than five years later, however, there was barely a word on the topic, the vogue having apparently expired.

See al-Qarāfī, al-Furūq, 1: 128–29.

See al-Qarāfī, al-Furūq, 1: 128–29.)| false
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A. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship, 108. For an earlier treatment of al-Wansharīsī’s objections as constituting claims of fact, see my “Muslims, Islamic Law, and the Sociopolitical Reality in the United States,” The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 17: 2 (2000): 1–28 at 13–17.

A. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship, 108. For an earlier treatment of al-Wansharīsī’s objections as constituting claims of fact, see my “Muslims, Islamic Law, and the Sociopolitical Reality in the United States,” The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 17: 2 (2000): 1–28 at 13–17.)| false
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See my discussion below, pp. 282–285 on the concept of the secular in Islam.

See, e.g., S.L. Carter, God’s Name in Vain: The Wrongs and Rights of Religion in Politics (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 2, 30–2, 185 and passim; S. Hauerwas, “Character, Narrative, and Growth in the Christian Life,” The Hauerwas Reader, ed. J. Berkman and M. Cartwright (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 221–54, esp. 252. This ability to counter the power of the state was demonstrably more present in classical Islam, e.g., in the form of the madhhab. Today, by contrast, the religious establishment in virtually every majority-Sunni state has almost entirely lost its ability to challenge the state, resulting in what one might call “voluntary totalitarianism,” according to which, even if governments do not seek a monopoly on power (which they certainly do) they come to enjoy it by default, given the erosion of sustained centers of countervailing collective commitment. For the basis of this idea, see S.S. Wolin, Politics and Vision, xvi (and 591 ff.), where the author speaks of “inverted totalitarianism” and suggests that the total fragmentation of alternative centers of authority or power, “mak[e] it difficult to form effective majorities and easier to divide and rule.” Meanwhile, as extreme and misguided as some contemporary Islamist movements might be, restoring (and, alas, in instances, tipping) this ‘balance’ is a major goal among them.

See, e.g., S.L. Carter, God’s Name in Vain: The Wrongs and Rights of Religion in Politics (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 2, 30–2, 185 and passim; S. Hauerwas, “Character, Narrative, and Growth in the Christian Life,” The Hauerwas Reader, ed. J. Berkman and M. Cartwright (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 221–54, esp. 252. This ability to counter the power of the state was demonstrably more present in classical Islam, e.g., in the form of the madhhab. Today, by contrast, the religious establishment in virtually every majority-Sunni state has almost entirely lost its ability to challenge the state, resulting in what one might call “voluntary totalitarianism,” according to which, even if governments do not seek a monopoly on power (which they certainly do) they come to enjoy it by default, given the erosion of sustained centers of countervailing collective commitment. For the basis of this idea, see S.S. Wolin, Politics and Vision, xvi (and 591 ff.), where the author speaks of “inverted totalitarianism” and suggests that the total fragmentation of alternative centers of authority or power, “mak[e] it difficult to form effective majorities and easier to divide and rule.” Meanwhile, as extreme and misguided as some contemporary Islamist movements might be, restoring (and, alas, in instances, tipping) this ‘balance’ is a major goal among them. )| false
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C. Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 2–3.

C. Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 2–3. )| false
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See, e.g., A. March, “Secularism and Neutrality,” 2821; A. An-Na‘im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari‘a (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 1.

See, e.g., A. March, “Secularism and Neutrality,” 2821; A. An-Na‘im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari‘a (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 1.)| false
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S.L. Carter, God’s Name in Vain, 4. Further, H.A. Agrama speaks of the secular as “the fashioning of religion as an object of continual management and intervention, and of shaping religious life and sensibility to fit the presuppositions and ongoing requirements of liberal governance.” See H.A. Agrama, Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and the Modern Rule of Law in Egypt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 24.

S.L. Carter, God’s Name in Vain, 4. Further, H.A. Agrama speaks of the secular as “the fashioning of religion as an object of continual management and intervention, and of shaping religious life and sensibility to fit the presuppositions and ongoing requirements of liberal governance.” See H.A. Agrama, Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and the Modern Rule of Law in Egypt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 24.)| false
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N. Stolzenberg, “The Profanity of the Law,” in Law and the Sacred, ed. A. Sarat, L. Douglas and M.M. Umphrey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 34.

N. Stolzenberg, “The Profanity of the Law,” in Law and the Sacred, ed. A. Sarat, L. Douglas and M.M. Umphrey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 34.)| false
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See Stolzenberg, “Profanity,” 41–51. I am not arguing that this explanation of the emergence of a distinctly secular realm is the view of all Christians, either contemporaneously or historically. There does appear, however, to be a tradition in Protestantism that is explicitly committed to this approach. One authority summarizes the view of Luther as follows: “In his tract On Trading and Usury (1524), his argument began by laying down the strict Christian teachings on the subject; soon, however, he was led to admit that the Christian ethic was of little utility here inasmuch as most members of society did not act as Christians. His solution was to abandon the Christian argument and to invoke, instead, the coercive arm of government. The argument ended on the note that the world would be reduced to chaos if men tried to govern by the Gospel.” See Wolin, Politics and Vision, 147. Meanwhile, what might be taken as a counter-interpretation suggests that secularism in America entails not opposition between religion and the secular but an “unacknowledged collusion between the secular and dominant Protestantism.” Indeed, the standard criterion that privileges “individuals’ sincerity as the testing point for religious protection rather than [religions’] communal criteria reflects a particularly Protestant view of religion.” See S.G. Davaney, “The Religious-Secular Divide: The U.S. Case,” in Social Research 76:4 (2009): 1327–32 at 1329 and 1330.

See Stolzenberg, “Profanity,” 41–51. I am not arguing that this explanation of the emergence of a distinctly secular realm is the view of all Christians, either contemporaneously or historically. There does appear, however, to be a tradition in Protestantism that is explicitly committed to this approach. One authority summarizes the view of Luther as follows: “In his tract On Trading and Usury (1524), his argument began by laying down the strict Christian teachings on the subject; soon, however, he was led to admit that the Christian ethic was of little utility here inasmuch as most members of society did not act as Christians. His solution was to abandon the Christian argument and to invoke, instead, the coercive arm of government. The argument ended on the note that the world would be reduced to chaos if men tried to govern by the Gospel.” See Wolin, Politics and Vision, 147. Meanwhile, what might be taken as a counter-interpretation suggests that secularism in America entails not opposition between religion and the secular but an “unacknowledged collusion between the secular and dominant Protestantism.” Indeed, the standard criterion that privileges “individuals’ sincerity as the testing point for religious protection rather than [religions’] communal criteria reflects a particularly Protestant view of religion.” See S.G. Davaney, “The Religious-Secular Divide: The U.S. Case,” in Social Research 76:4 (2009): 1327–32 at 1329 and 1330.)| false
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See, e.g., A. Marmor, Law in the Age of Pluralism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 89–121, esp. 96–97.

See, e.g., A. Marmor, Law in the Age of Pluralism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 89–121, esp. 96–97.)| false
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