In a series of judgments starting in 1959, Pakistani judges reformed Islamic family law by extending women’s right to no-fault based divorce (khulʿ). For this purpose, they directly interpreted the Qurʾān and Sunnah, and removed the requirement of the consent of a husband for judicial khulʿ. This article analyses the methods and the methodological tools that Pakistani judges used to justify the unilateral right of women to no-fault judicial divorce. The analysis shows that instead of following the opinions of classical jurists, Pakistani judges exercised independent legal reasoning (ijtihād). By using judicial ijtihād, Pakistani judgescontinue to play a key role in reforming classical Islamic family law with changing circumstances.
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See Wael B. Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013); Rudolph Peters, “From Jurists’ Law to Statute Law or What Happens When the Shari’a is Codified,” Mediterranean Politics 7 (2002): 82-95; Nathan J. Brown, “Sharia and State in the Modern Muslim Middle East,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 29 (1997): 359-76; Aharon Layish, “The Transformation of the Sharī‘a from Jurists’ Law to Statutory Law in the Contemporary Muslim World,” Die Welt des Islams 44 (2004): 85-113; Michael R. Anderson, “Legal Scholarship and the Politics of Islam in British India,” in Perspectives on Islamic Law, Justice, and Society, ed. Ravindra S. Khare (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 65-91; Scott A. Kugle, “Framed, Blamed and Renamed: The Recasting of Islamic Jurisprudence in Colonial South Asia,” Modern Asian Studies 35 (2001): 257-313; Elisa Giunchi, “The Reinvention of Sharīʿa under the British Raj: In Search of Authenticity and Certainty,” The Journal of Asian Studies 69 (2010): 1119-42.
See Esther van Eijk, Family Law in Syria: Patriarchy, Pluralism and Personal Status Laws (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016); Maaike Voorhoeve, Gender and Divorce Law in North Africa: Sharia, Custom and the Personal Status Code in Tunisia (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014); Judith E. Tucker, In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine (London: University of California Press, 2000); Alan M. Guenther, “Syed Mahmood and the Transformation of Muslim Law in British India” (PhD diss., McGill University, 2004); Baber Johansen, “Legal Literature and the Problem of Change: The Case of the Land Rent,” in Islam and Public Law: Classical and Contemporary Studies, ed. Chibli Mallat (London: Graham & Trotman Ltd, 1993), 29-47; Colin Imber, Ebu’s-su‘ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997).
See Iza R. Hussin, The Politics of Islamic Law: Local Elites, Colonial Authority and the Making of the Muslim State (London: University of Chicago Press, 2016); M.B. Hooker, Islam in South-East Asia (Leiden: Brill, 1983); M. Reza Pirbhai, Reconsidering Islam in a South Asian Context (Leiden: Brill, 2009).
Suzanne Last Stone, “Jewish Marriage and Divorce Law,” in The Islamic Marriage Contract: Case Studies in Islamic Family Law, ed. Asifa Quraishi and Frank E. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 57-86; Karin C. Yefet, “What’s the Constitution Got To Do With It? Regulating Marriage in Pakistan,” Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 16 (2009): 347-78; Yüksel Sezgin, Human Rights under State-Enforced Religious Family Laws in Israel, Egypt and India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 77-118, 159-204.
Syed Abu al-Ala Maududi, Ḥuqūq al-Zaujayn (Lahore: Idārat Tarjamān al-Qurʾān, 1943; reprint, 2013), 60-61 (in Urdu).
Abdur Rahim, “A Historical Sketch of the Growth of Mohamedan Jurisprudence,” Calcutta Law Journal 3 (1906): 109n.
Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 70-71; Noel J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964), 80-82. For a critique of Schacht and Coulson, see Amr A. Shalakany, “Islamic Legal Histories,” Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Law 1 (2008): 1.
Knut S. Vikør, Between God and the Sultan: A History of Islamic Law (London: Hurst & Co, 2005), 160-61.
Wael B. Hallaq, Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), xii, 239.
Sherman A. Jackson, Islamic Law and the State: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (Leiden: Brill, 1996), xxvii-xxxiii, 228-29.
Muhammad Z. Abbasi, “Islamic Law and Social Change: An Insight into the Making of Anglo-Muhammadan Law,” Journal of Islamic Studies 3 (2014): 263-97; Eric L. Beverley, “Property, Authority and Personal Law: Waqf in Colonial South Asia,” South Asia Research 31 (2011): 155-82.
Gregory C. Kozlowski, Muslim Endowments and Society in British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 177-91; Fareeha Khan, “Traditionalist Approaches to Sharīʿah Reform: Mawlana Ashraf ʿAli Thānawi’s Fatawa on Women’s Right to Divorce” (PhD diss., The University of Michigan, 2008); Rohit De, “Mumtaz Bibi’s Broken Heart: The Many Lives of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 46 (2009): 105-30.
Abdur Rahman, Institutes of Mussalman Law (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink & Co., 1907), 158-59.
Dr Qari Muhammad Tahir, ʿĀʾilī Qawānīn aur Pakistānī Siyāsat (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1999), 114-15 (in Urdu).
Mian Abdur Rashid, “Report of the Commission on Marriage and Family Law,” in Marriage Commission Report X-Rayed, 66.
Mian Abdur Rashid, “Report of the Commission on Marriage and Family Law,” in Marriage Commission Report X-Rayed, 66. This does not mean that the legislature was unaware of the demand for reform of the law on khulʿ. Begum Jehan Ara Shahnawaz in the National Assembly made one such demand in 1950 and she repeated it in 1954. Khawar Mumtaz, “Political Participation: Women in National Legislatures in Pakistan,” in Shaping Women’s Lives: Laws, Practices & Strategies in Pakistan, eds. Farida Shaheed, Sohail Akbar Warraich, Cassandra Balchin and Aisha Gazdar (Lahore: Shirkat Gah, 1998), 328-38.
A decade later, in 1972, yet another attempt was made to bring the MFLO into “accordance with the Qurʾan and Sunnah” by setting up a board of ʿulamāʾ. Ibid, 338.
Rubya Mehdi, The Islamisation of the Law in Pakistan (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1994), 27-31.
Wael B. Hallaq, Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 459-73.
Wael B. Hallaq, Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 448.
Mike Macnair, “Equity and Conscience,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27 (2007): 659-81.
Muhammad Munir, Precedent in Pakistani Law (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 2014), 8-32.
J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 195-212.
Miriam Hoexter, “Qāḍī, Muftī and Ruler: Their Roles in the Development of Islamic Law,” in Law, Custom, and Statute in the Muslim World, ed. Ron Shaham (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 67-85.
Alan M. Guenther, “Hanafi Fiqh in Mughal India: The Fatāwá-i ʿĀlamgīrī,” in India’s Islamic Traditions, 711-1750, ed. Richard M. Eaton (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 212-29; Syed K. Rashid, “Analysing the Level of Maturity Attained by the Law of Waqf in Mughal India as Shown in the Fatāwā al-ʿĀlamgīriyya,” Journal of Objective Studies 19 & 20 (2008): 1.
Joseph Schacht, “Problems of Modern Islamic Legislation,” Studia Islamica 12 (1960): 99, 110-11.
Noel J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964), 147.
Augustus H.F. Lefroy, “Basis of Case-Law,” Law Quarterly Review 22 (1906): 293-306.
Warraich and Balchin, “Confusion Worse Confounded”, 202. Some family court judges regarded the current law on khulʿ as un-Islamic and stated that these legal developments were a result of foreign sponsored NGOs. They admitted that they deliberately try to delay the legal proceedings in order to provide time to spouses for reconciliation. Other judges regarded this change in the law as Islamic, because, in their view, Islamic law embraces change with changing circumstances. They argued that it is futile to force a wife to live with her husband when she does not want to do so. (These observations are based on the author’s personal interviews conducted with the judges of the family courts in Lahore in June 2015).
In 2008, the Council of Islamic Ideology, which is an advisory body, proposed that a wife should have a right to demand a divorce from her husband by serving a notice upon him setting out the reasons and grounds for her demand. A copy of the notice should be sent to the Chairman Union Council. The divorce will become effective upon the expiration of ninety days if no reconciliation happens between the spouses, or the wife does not withdraw her notice, or the husband does not respond. Council of Islamic Ideology, Muslim ʿAʾlī Qawānīn Ordinance 1961: Naẓar Thānī aur Sifārishāt (Government of Pakistan, 2009) (in Urdu). The government did not legislate upon the recommendations of the Council. In May 2015, the Council under the leadership of its new Chairman, Maulana Sheerani, suggested that the judicial practice of granting khulʿ without the consent of a husband is not in accordance with Sharīʿa. Council of Islamic Ideology, ‘Session No. 199’ (27-28 May 2015) <http://cii.gov.pk/announcements/Dissolution.pdf> (accessed 10 June 2016). This suggestion shows that the debate between traditionalists and modernists on the issue of family law reforms in Pakistan is far from over.
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In a series of judgments starting in 1959, Pakistani judges reformed Islamic family law by extending women’s right to no-fault based divorce (khulʿ). For this purpose, they directly interpreted the Qurʾān and Sunnah, and removed the requirement of the consent of a husband for judicial khulʿ. This article analyses the methods and the methodological tools that Pakistani judges used to justify the unilateral right of women to no-fault judicial divorce. The analysis shows that instead of following the opinions of classical jurists, Pakistani judges exercised independent legal reasoning (ijtihād). By using judicial ijtihād, Pakistani judgescontinue to play a key role in reforming classical Islamic family law with changing circumstances.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 1348 | 248 | 11 |
Full Text Views | 152 | 14 | 3 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 171 | 61 | 8 |