Does Negotiation Have a Future in Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction?
In: International NegotiationSearch for other papers by Lloyd Jensen in
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Abstract
Despite the heightened level of concern about weapons of mass destruction since 9/11, negotiations for strengthening the WMD nonproliferation regime have been somewhat less than productive. The fact that the material and technology for producing such weapons is also used for peaceful purposes helps explain the limited progress. Lack of trust, concern about equality and fairness as well as the tendency to use negotiations for ulterior purposes also make progress difficult. After considering these points, the article discusses some of the incentives and disincentives that have been used to influence positions on the nonproliferation issue and how paying attention to the needs and interests of the would-be proliferators might increase the chances of reaching mutually beneficial agreements.
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Does Negotiation Have a Future in Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction?
In: International NegotiationSearch for other papers by Lloyd Jensen in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
Despite the heightened level of concern about weapons of mass destruction since 9/11, negotiations for strengthening the WMD nonproliferation regime have been somewhat less than productive. The fact that the material and technology for producing such weapons is also used for peaceful purposes helps explain the limited progress. Lack of trust, concern about equality and fairness as well as the tendency to use negotiations for ulterior purposes also make progress difficult. After considering these points, the article discusses some of the incentives and disincentives that have been used to influence positions on the nonproliferation issue and how paying attention to the needs and interests of the would-be proliferators might increase the chances of reaching mutually beneficial agreements.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 217 | 22 | 2 |
| Full Text Views | 89 | 0 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 42 | 1 | 0 |
