This article examines a negotiation under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on a Convention Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. We view the OECD negotiation as the culmination of 20 years of US diplomatic pressure. The investigation provides a detailed description of the Bribery Convention in terms of negotiators' preferences. To accomplish this we structure the talks within a negotiation analytic framework specifying parties, issues, resolutions, preferences, and reservation values. Preference data for the ten largest OECD exporters are presented. This permits the outcome to be described in quantitative terms. Pushing the analysis forward, we assess the impact on the negotiation process of the addition of a highly divisive issue. The divisive issue splits the parties into two coalitions, threatens deadlock, and is left unresolved until the final hours of the negotiation, setting up a game of Chicken. This study offers lessons for the management of future international economic negotiations. Complex multiparty negotiations can benefit from small teams of facilitators focused on designing and managing the negotiation process.