Accountability and Independence of International Election Observers

in International Organizations Law Review
Restricted Access
Get Access to Full Text
Rent on DeepDyve

Have an Access Token?



Enter your access token to activate and access content online.

Please login and go to your personal user account to enter your access token.



Help

Have Institutional Access?



Access content through your institution. Any other coaching guidance?



Connect

Abstract

International election monitoring has become ever more important in the national as well as the international context. Plenty of (regional) International Organizations (and NGOs) send Election Observers Missions (EOMs) to countries in order to assess the quality of their democratic process and elections. Whereas the influence of EOMs is largely undisputed, their independence, impartiality and accountability have been less discussed. This paper describes the legal set-up of EOMs in order to assess their independence and accountability. It also uses accountability mechanisms as discussed in international law scholarship (ILA Report and the Global Administrative Law project) in order to analyze the accountability mechanisms currently in place for EOMs.

Accountability and Independence of International Election Observers

in International Organizations Law Review

Sections

Index Card

Content Metrics

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 5 5 2
Full Text Views 1 1 0
PDF Downloads 1 1 0
EPUB Downloads 0 0 0