The objective of this paper is to spell out the legal consequences of the concept "responsibility to protect" (R2P), postulated as a binding legal principle of international law, for the Security Council and its members. The paper is a thought experiment, because the binding legal force of R2P is not settled. My argument is that, once R2P is accepted as a full-fledged legal principle, the Security Council (and its members) would be under a legal obligation to authorize or to take sufficiently robust action in R2P situations. The paper then discusses the problems engendered by the acceptance of such a material obligation and suggests a procedural obligation to justify inaction instead.
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All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
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Abstract Views | 1161 | 230 | 13 |
Full Text Views | 418 | 23 | 2 |
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The objective of this paper is to spell out the legal consequences of the concept "responsibility to protect" (R2P), postulated as a binding legal principle of international law, for the Security Council and its members. The paper is a thought experiment, because the binding legal force of R2P is not settled. My argument is that, once R2P is accepted as a full-fledged legal principle, the Security Council (and its members) would be under a legal obligation to authorize or to take sufficiently robust action in R2P situations. The paper then discusses the problems engendered by the acceptance of such a material obligation and suggests a procedural obligation to justify inaction instead.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 1161 | 230 | 13 |
Full Text Views | 418 | 23 | 2 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 496 | 59 | 6 |