Ian K. Steele, Guerrillas and Grenadiers: The Struggle for Canada, 1689–1760 (Toronto, Ont.: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), 132.

 Ian K. Steele, Guerrillas and Grenadiers: The Struggle for Canada, 1689–1760 (Toronto, Ont.: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), 132.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 Dallas Irvine, “The First British Regulars in North America”, Military Affairs 9 (Winter 1945): 337–354 and John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making of the Frontier (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

 Dallas Irvine, “The First British Regulars in North America”, Military Affairs 9 (Winter 1945): 337–354 and John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making of the Frontier (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 Thomas E. Crocker, Braddock’s March: How the Man Sent to Seize a Continent Changed American History (Yardley, Pa.: Westholme Publishing, 2011) offers one of the more recent campaign-orientated examinations of Braddock’s defeat. For Crocker, Braddock was ultimately confounded because of “a confluence of adverse circumstances”. These included not only his French and Indian enemies but a “formidable geography, almost non-existent intelligence, colonial assemblies which would not pay [i.e. contribute to his campaign financially as expressed in his orders], colonial governors who dissembled, Americans with their own agendas, Quakers who did not lift a finger, Indians who failed to materialize, bad weather, drunken and ill-humored troops, and conniving staff officers”, at 242. All of this is true, of course, but when examining the battle itself, it still does not fully explain why the troops became as panic-stricken as they did when confronted by Native American warriors. As mentioned, it is the extent of this terror, which clearly ran deep in the British psyche, that really requires significant elaboration if we are to understand, at least when reflecting upon the engagement itself, why we read of Braddock’s men eventually running as “Sheep before the Hounds, leav’g the Artillery, Ammunition, Provisions, and, every individual thing we had with us prey to the Enemy”, George Washington to Mrs. Mary Washington, 18 July 1755, in ed. John Clement Fitzpatrick, The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1749–1799, 39 vols. (Washington, d.c.: United States Government Printing Office, 1931), 1:150–152.

 Thomas E. Crocker, Braddock’s March: How the Man Sent to Seize a Continent Changed American History (Yardley, Pa.: Westholme Publishing, 2011) offers one of the more recent campaign-orientated examinations of Braddock’s defeat. For Crocker, Braddock was ultimately confounded because of “a confluence of adverse circumstances”. These included not only his French and Indian enemies but a “formidable geography, almost non-existent intelligence, colonial assemblies which would not pay [i.e. contribute to his campaign financially as expressed in his orders], colonial governors who dissembled, Americans with their own agendas, Quakers who did not lift a finger, Indians who failed to materialize, bad weather, drunken and ill-humored troops, and conniving staff officers”, at 242. All of this is true, of course, but when examining the battle itself, it still does not fully explain why the troops became as panic-stricken as they did when confronted by Native American warriors. As mentioned, it is the extent of this terror, which clearly ran deep in the British psyche, that really requires significant elaboration if we are to understand, at least when reflecting upon the engagement itself, why we read of Braddock’s men eventually running as “Sheep before the Hounds, leav’g the Artillery, Ammunition, Provisions, and, every individual thing we had with us prey to the Enemy”, George Washington to Mrs. Mary Washington, 18 July 1755, in ed. John Clement Fitzpatrick, The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1749–1799, 39 vols. (Washington, d.c.: United States Government Printing Office, 1931), 1:150–152.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 Stanley Pargellis, “Braddock’s Defeat”, American Historical Review 41, no. 2 (January 1936): 253–269 and Peter Russell, “Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740–1760”, William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 35, no. 4 (October 1978): 629–652.

 Stanley Pargellis, “Braddock’s Defeat”, American Historical Review 41, no. 2 (January 1936): 253–269 and Peter Russell, “Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740–1760”, William and Mary Quarterly, 3^rd ser., 35, no. 4 (October 1978): 629–652.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766 (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 90. William M. Fowler, Jr. is another historian who has examined the Braddock defeat within the context of a wider French and Indian War narrative. Fowler sees the French response to the British advance as a desperate attempt to fight a rear-guard action that would allow the majority of the garrison to reinforce the more strategically vital Fort Niagara. The defeat of Braddock was, for Fowler, the consequence of a surprise encounter that caught the British off guard. The French and Indians were quick to adapt to the terrain on which they fought, while the nervous British struggled to order themselves in the midst of the unfolding chaos that soon befell their column. All of this is true, but it is the reasons for the depth of British fear (particularly of Indian warriors) requires further explanation when examining the Battle of the Monongahela, William M. Fowler, Jr., Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754–1763 (New York: Walker Publishing Company, 2005), 64–73.

 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766 (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 90. William M. Fowler, Jr. is another historian who has examined the Braddock defeat within the context of a wider French and Indian War narrative. Fowler sees the French response to the British advance as a desperate attempt to fight a rear-guard action that would allow the majority of the garrison to reinforce the more strategically vital Fort Niagara. The defeat of Braddock was, for Fowler, the consequence of a surprise encounter that caught the British off guard. The French and Indians were quick to adapt to the terrain on which they fought, while the nervous British struggled to order themselves in the midst of the unfolding chaos that soon befell their column. All of this is true, but it is the reasons for the depth of British fear (particularly of Indian warriors) requires further explanation when examining the Battle of the Monongahela, William M. Fowler, Jr., Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754–1763 (New York: Walker Publishing Company, 2005), 64–73.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008). Silver identifies the “anti –Indian sublime” as “horror-filled rhetoric of victimization, intent on the damage that Indians had done to colonists’ bodies and families”. Ibid. xx. Although no Pennsylvanian units served in Braddock’s army—the colonial element of his army consisted of troops from Virginia, Maryland and North Carolina (while New York and South Carolina provided independent regular companies)—many of the albeit diverse wagoners attached to that general’s force were from Pennsylvania (having been induced to serve by Benjamin Franklin), F. T. Nichols, “The Organization of Braddock’s Army”, William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 4, no. 2 (April 1947): 125–147.

 Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008). Silver identifies the “anti –Indian sublime” as “horror-filled rhetoric of victimization, intent on the damage that Indians had done to colonists’ bodies and families”. Ibid. xx. Although no Pennsylvanian units served in Braddock’s army—the colonial element of his army consisted of troops from Virginia, Maryland and North Carolina (while New York and South Carolina provided independent regular companies)—many of the albeit diverse wagoners attached to that general’s force were from Pennsylvania (having been induced to serve by Benjamin Franklin), F. T. Nichols, “The Organization of Braddock’s Army”, William and Mary Quarterly, 3^rd ser., 4, no. 2 (April 1947): 125–147.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, 45.

 Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, 45.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 Frederich W. Gleach, Powhatan’s World and Colonial Virginia: A Conflict of Cultures (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 47–51.

 Frederich W. Gleach, Powhatan’s World and Colonial Virginia: A Conflict of Cultures (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 47–51.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 David L. Preston, “La Bataille de la Malengueulee, 1755: New Perspectives on Braddock’s Defeat”, The Filson Historical Society, 26 October 2012, http://www.filsonhistorical.org/media/41307/preston paper 2012 conference.pdf (accessed 15 September 2014).

 David L. Preston, “La Bataille de la Malengueulee, 1755: New Perspectives on Braddock’s Defeat”, The Filson Historical Society, 26 October 2012, http://www.filsonhistorical.org/media/41307/preston paper 2012 conference.pdf (accessed 15 September 2014).)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 Quoted in J. A. Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army 1715–1795 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 357.

 Quoted in J. A. Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army 1715–1795 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 357.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 William H. Guthman, Drums A’beating, Trumpets Sounding. Artistically Carved Powder Horns in the Provincial Manner, 1741–1781 (Hartford, Ct.: Connecticut Historical Society, 1993), 101–102.

 William H. Guthman, Drums A’beating, Trumpets Sounding. Artistically Carved Powder Horns in the Provincial Manner, 1741–1781 (Hartford, Ct.: Connecticut Historical Society, 1993), 101–102.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 See Ian McCulloch, “‘Within ourselves’: The Development of British Light Infantry in North America during the Seven Years War”, Canadian Military History 7 (Spring 1998): 41–55.

 See Ian McCulloch, “‘Within ourselves’: The Development of British Light Infantry in North America during the Seven Years War”, Canadian Military History 7 (Spring 1998): 41–55.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation