Religious Accommodation in the American Workplace
The Consequences of the Supreme Court Decision in eeoc v. Abercrombie & Fitch
In: Journal of Law, Religion and StateSearch for other papers by Debbie Kaminer in
Current site
Google Scholar
This article examines how the us Supreme Court’s decision in eeoc v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. represents a shift in the Court’s analysis in religious accommodation cases under §701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As a result of this decision lower courts are now likely to provide greater protection to employees requesting accommodation under §701(j) for two reasons. First, Abercrombie held that an employer can be liable for religious discrimination even if it does not have “actual knowledge” of an applicant’s or employee’s need for religious accommodation. Additionally, the Court also determined that religious accommodation claims can be raised as disparate treatment claims, and in doing so emphasized for the first time that §701(j) mandates more than formal equality. This is an important shift since previous federal decisions often relied on formal equality in limiting an employer’s accommodation obligation.
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135 S.Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015). Justice Alito wrote a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment but holding that there is a knowledge requirement and that in this case there was “ample evidence” that “Abercrombie knew Elauf was a Muslim and that she wore the scarf for a religious reason.” Ibid. at 2034 (Alito, J., concurring).
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118 Cong. Rec. 706 (1972). Senator Randolph, who sponsored the legislation, stated that in most cases accommodation would be required.
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See generally, Engel, supra note 14.
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135 S.Ct. 2028 (2015).
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135 S.Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015).
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731 F.3d at 1111.
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731 F.3d at 1116.
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135 S.Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015). Justice Alito wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment but arguing that there is a knowledge requirement and that in this case there was “ample evidence” that “Abercrombie knew Elauf is a Muslim and that she wore the scarf for a religious reason.” Ibid. at 2034 (Alito, J., concurring).
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135 S.Ct. 2028, 2033.
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135 S.Ct. 2028, 2034 (2015).
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135 S.Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015).
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Religious Accommodation in the American Workplace
The Consequences of the Supreme Court Decision in eeoc v. Abercrombie & Fitch
In: Journal of Law, Religion and StateSearch for other papers by Debbie Kaminer in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
This article examines how the us Supreme Court’s decision in eeoc v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. represents a shift in the Court’s analysis in religious accommodation cases under §701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As a result of this decision lower courts are now likely to provide greater protection to employees requesting accommodation under §701(j) for two reasons. First, Abercrombie held that an employer can be liable for religious discrimination even if it does not have “actual knowledge” of an applicant’s or employee’s need for religious accommodation. Additionally, the Court also determined that religious accommodation claims can be raised as disparate treatment claims, and in doing so emphasized for the first time that §701(j) mandates more than formal equality. This is an important shift since previous federal decisions often relied on formal equality in limiting an employer’s accommodation obligation.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 1031 | 185 | 76 |
| Full Text Views | 166 | 2 | 1 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 58 | 2 | 0 |
