George Rainbolt, ‘Perfect and Imperfect Obligations’, Philosophical Studies 98 (2000), pp. 233–56.

 George Rainbolt, ‘Perfect and Imperfect Obligations’, Philosophical Studies 98 (2000), pp. 233–56.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 See Violetta Igneski, ‘Distance, Determinacy and the Duty to Aid: A Reply to Kamm’, Law and Philosophy 20 (2001), p. 612; and John Witherspoon, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, ed. Collins (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1912), p. 56.

 See Violetta Igneski, ‘Distance, Determinacy and the Duty to Aid: A Reply to Kamm’, Law and Philosophy 20 (2001), p. 612; and John Witherspoon, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, ed. Collins (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1912), p. 56.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), pp. 49–50; Onora O’Neill, ‘Children’s Rights and Children’s Lives’, in Constructions of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 189; Pufendorf, On the Law, § III.iv.6.

 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), pp. 49–50; Onora O’Neill, ‘Children’s Rights and Children’s Lives’, in Constructions of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 189; Pufendorf, On the Law, § III.iv.6.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 Michael Stocker, ‘Acts, Perfect Duties, and Imperfect Duties’, Review of Metaphysics 20 (1967), pp. 507–17.

 Michael Stocker, ‘Acts, Perfect Duties, and Imperfect Duties’, Review of Metaphysics 20 (1967), pp. 507–17.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 See Jan Narveson, Morality and Utility (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), pp. 231–8; and Bertrand Bandman, ‘Do Future Generations Have the Right to Breathe Clean Air?’ Political Theory 10 (1982), pp. 95–102.

 See Jan Narveson, Morality and Utility (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), pp. 231–8; and Bertrand Bandman, ‘Do Future Generations Have the Right to Breathe Clean Air?’ Political Theory 10 (1982), pp. 95–102.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 Jonathan Cohen, ‘Who is Starving Whom?’ Theoria 47 (1981), pp. 65–81; Liam Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

 Jonathan Cohen, ‘Who is Starving Whom?’ Theoria 47 (1981), pp. 65–81; Liam Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 Ibid., p. 77.

 This case is from James Rachels, ‘Killing and Starving to Death’, Philosophy 54 (1979), pp. 162–3.

 This case is from James Rachels, ‘Killing and Starving to Death’, Philosophy 54 (1979), pp. 162–3.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 Cohen, ‘Starving’, pp. 76–8; Murphy, Moral Demands, pp. 127–33. Actually, Murphy’s analysis of this scenario is a bit more complicated, in ways that sometimes yield more plausible but sometimes more implausible results. For example, Murphy acknowledges that on his view it follows that anyone who would on balance be better off under full compliance with morality isn’t required to help at all in the real world. So, if you would have a higher level of well-being under full compliance, you have no obligation to do anything for anyone else. Since it is not entirely implausible to suppose that many people would be better off in a world of full compliance (as compared to the actual world), Murphy’s principle of beneficence would never require such people to save a drowning child, even if doing so meant no more than tossing a life preserver. (Murphy tries to soften the blow of this conclusion a bit, but his efforts don’t strike me as very successful.)

 Cohen, ‘Starving’, pp. 76–8; Murphy, Moral Demands, pp. 127–33. Actually, Murphy’s analysis of this scenario is a bit more complicated, in ways that sometimes yield more plausible but sometimes more implausible results. For example, Murphy acknowledges that on his view it follows that anyone who would on balance be better off under full compliance with morality isn’t required to help at all in the real world. So, if you would have a higher level of well-being under full compliance, you have no obligation to do anything for anyone else. Since it is not entirely implausible to suppose that many people would be better off in a world of full compliance (as compared to the actual world), Murphy’s principle of beneficence would never require such people to save a drowning child, even if doing so meant no more than tossing a life preserver. (Murphy tries to soften the blow of this conclusion a bit, but his efforts don’t strike me as very successful.))| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 Anthony Quinton, ‘Social Objects’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1975), p. 17.

 Anthony Quinton, ‘Social Objects’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1975), p. 17.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 John Searle, ‘Collective Intentions and Actions’, in Intentions in Communication (Cambridge, ma: MIT Press, 1990), p. 1. Other non-reductive views can be found in Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Russell Hardin, Morality Within the Limits of Reason (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988); and Austen Clark, ‘Beliefs and Desires Incorporated’, The Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994), pp. 404–25; among many others.

 John Searle, ‘Collective Intentions and Actions’, in Intentions in Communication (Cambridge, ma: MIT Press, 1990), p. 1. Other non-reductive views can be found in Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Russell Hardin, Morality Within the Limits of Reason (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988); and Austen Clark, ‘Beliefs and Desires Incorporated’, The Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994), pp. 404–25; among many others.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 See e.g. Onora O’Neill, ‘Global justice: whose obligations?’ in The Ethics of Assistance, ed. Chatterjee (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), pp. 242–259, and David Miller, ‘Holding Nations Responsible’, Ethics 114 (2004), pp. 240–68.

 See e.g. Onora O’Neill, ‘Global justice: whose obligations?’ in The Ethics of Assistance, ed. Chatterjee (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), pp. 242–259, and David Miller, ‘Holding Nations Responsible’, Ethics 114 (2004), pp. 240–68.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 See e.g. Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002) for an argument of this type. If these sorts of considerations are the ones underlying our duties to the poor, then (as Pogge stresses) the duty is no longer a positive duty to aid, but rather a negative duty not to harm (or a duty to fulfill contractual agreements, etc.). ‘Beneficence’ therefore may no longer seem like the proper label. I agree that this is a somewhat revisionary suggestion. That said, this analysis would apply to most of the cases that are central to philosophical discussions of beneficence, and arguments like Pogge’s are frequently treated as players in the beneficence debate – rivals to traditional accounts grounded in positive duties. (See Garrett Cullity, The Moral Demands of Affluence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 8–9, 196–9.) For these reasons, although my proposal may be revisionary it doesn’t strike me as objectionably so.

 See e.g. Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002) for an argument of this type. If these sorts of considerations are the ones underlying our duties to the poor, then (as Pogge stresses) the duty is no longer a positive duty to aid, but rather a negative duty not to harm (or a duty to fulfill contractual agreements, etc.). ‘Beneficence’ therefore may no longer seem like the proper label. I agree that this is a somewhat revisionary suggestion. That said, this analysis would apply to most of the cases that are central to philosophical discussions of beneficence, and arguments like Pogge’s are frequently treated as players in the beneficence debate – rivals to traditional accounts grounded in positive duties. (See Garrett Cullity, The Moral Demands of Affluence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 8–9, 196–9.) For these reasons, although my proposal may be revisionary it doesn’t strike me as objectionably so.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation