Defending Shame

in Journal of Moral Philosophy
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I provide an overview of the excellent account of shame presented in Deonna’s, Rodogno’s and Teroni’s recent book, In Defense of Shame, raise a concern with their insistence that shame always involves autonomous values, and mention two contemporary issues for which their account is relevant.

Defending Shame

in Journal of Moral Philosophy

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References

1

Taylor G. 1985. Pride Shame and Guilt. Oxford: Oxford University Press

4

 For example: Gilbert P. 2003. Evolution Social Roles and the Differences in Shame and Guilt. Social Research 70(4) pp. 1205–1230.

5

Fessler D. 2004. Shame in Two Cultures: Implications for Evolutionary Approaches. Journal of Cognition and Culture 4(2) pp. 207–262.

6

Taylor G. 1995. Shame Integrity and Self-respect. In Robin S. Dillon ed. Dignity character and self-respect. New York: Routledge pp. 157–78 (p. 163).

10

Moore A. 2006. Maxims and thick ethical concepts. Ratio (new series) 19 pp. 129–47.

12

Goldie P. 2009. Thick concepts and emotion. In D. Callcut (ed.) Reading Bernard Williams. London; New York: Routledge pp. 94–109 (p. 96–99). See also FitzGerald C. & Goldie P. 2012. Thick concepts and their role in moral psychology. In R. Langdon & C. Mackensie eds. Emotions Imagination and Moral Reasoning. New York: Psychology Press pp. 219–236.

13

Morton A. 2013. Emotion and Imagination. Cambridge; Polity Press.

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