Well-Being Thresholds and Moral Priority

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
View More View Less
  • 1 Duke University

A welfarist basic minimum is a level of well-being which is the threshold for minimally adequate lives and which serves, in some sense, as a line of moral priority. In his ambitious and philosophically sophisticated book, Dale Dorsey takes on the task of specifying a welfarist basic minimum. His account revolves around the concept of a “project”: a long-term preference that determines the subject’s actions and decisions and provides narrative unity to her life. Dorsey argues that the welfarist basic minimum is a life whose subject achieves at least one valued project. In this review essay, I present three objections to Dorsey’s views. First, his distinction between projects and other preferences is unclear, and his treatment of the problem of adaptive valuations inadequate. Second, it is very implausible that every life with at least one valued project is better than every life with none. Finally, Dorsey’s specific account of moral priority yields the Nauseating Implication (my term) that giving a single below-threshold person a single valued project morally justifies depriving an indefinite number of worse-off individuals of all their non-project goods.

  • 7

    Richard B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). Dorsey does suggest that those unsatisfied with his account might rule out idealized valuations for lives that are objectively bad, i.e., bad on content-independent grounds (pp. 100–107). This solution to the problem of adaptive valuations will be not appealing to preferentialists about well-being.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • 14

     See Adler, Well-Being and Fair Distribution, pp. 307–98, arguing for a continuous prioritarian approach rather than sufficientism or plt.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 133 60 0
Full Text Views 156 3 0
PDF Downloads 11 2 0