Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge object that moral particularism ‘flattens the moral landscape’, that is, that particularism treats reasons of different kinds as if they were reasons of the same kind. This objection is misguided in two respects. First, particularists need not say that every feature can be a moral reason. Second, even if particularists were committed to saying that every feature can be a moral reason, they would still not be committed to the view that every feature can have direct moral relevance. The failure of this objection shows that the objection exploits side-constraints that need not be placed on moral particularism.
Jonathan Dancy‘Moral Particularism’Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(Fall 2013 Edition) Edward N. Zalta (ed.) <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/moral-particularism/>. Dancy’s ‘overall’ principles are the same as my ‘general’ principles.
See McKeever and RidgePrincipled Ethics pp. 41–43for their discussion of the role that ‘uncodifiability’ plays in particularist views. I disagree with their assessment since I think it can be shown that arguments from ‘radical holism’ are not in fact question-begging.
See for instance DancyEthics Without Principles pp. 8–9 80. Note that Dancy doesn’t think that the fact that good moral reasoning is non-monotonic entails particularism. This is because non-monotonicity is compatible with atomism about moral valences.