Jonas Olson writes that “a plausible moral error theory must be an error theory about all irreducible normativity”. I agree. But unlike Olson, I think we cannot believe this error theory. In this symposium contribution, I first argue that Olson should say that reasons for belief are irreducibly normative. I then argue that if reasons for belief are irreducibly normative, we cannot believe an error theory about all irreducible normativity. I then explain why I think Olson's objections to this argument fail. I end by showing that Olson cannot defend his view as a partly revisionary alternative to an error theory about all irreducible normativity.
Olson2014p. 122. Presumably what Olson means here is that facts that involve the favoring relation are not reducible to these other facts.
Olson2014pp. 123–4 136.
Olson2014pp. 127–35. Olson formulates these implications in terms of standards but they can also be formulated in terms of ends.
Olson2014p. 156 (italics added).
Olson2014pp. 158–9 164. Olson seems to think that when the term ‘reason’ is used in one of these ways (4) has the same meaning as (6) or (7). Alternatively you may think that when the term ‘reason’ is used in one of these ways (4) has the same truthmaker as (6) or (7) without having the same meaning as (6) or (7). My objection below also applies to this view.
Olson2014p. 165. You may think that Olson could also take (4) to be equivalent to the descriptive claim that there is evidence that p. But for this claim to be descriptive it must use the term ‘evidence’ to mean what Thomas Kelly calls ‘indicator evidence’: it must use this term to mean a consideration that indicates that p is true either by logically implying p or by raising the probability that p is true (see Kelly 2006 §3 and 2007 p. 470 and Olson 2014 pp. 160–4). And (4) is not equivalent to the claim that there is a consideration that either logically implies p or raises the probability that p is true. For a consideration can be a reason to believe a necessary truth without either logically implying this truth or making this truth more likely to hold. There is indicator evidence for a very large number of trivial beliefs that there is no reason to have since forming these beliefs would be a waste of your cognitive resources (see Harman 1986 p. 12). And there can perhaps also be instrumental reasons to have a belief for which there is no indicator evidence (though this is of course controversial).
See Streumer2013. In what follows I summarize a longer version of this argument that I give in Streumer forthcoming. Unlike Olson I do not think that claims about instrumental reasons can be equivalent to descriptive claims about what will promote the fulfillment of the agent’s desires and I do not apply the term ‘normative judgment’ to beliefs about standards such as (7) or (8). I therefore take the error theory I defend to be an error theory about all normative judgments rather than about all irreducible normativity.
Streumer2013p. 198. I there called this claim ‘(B2).’
Olson2014p. 158 n. 20. By ‘reducible’ reasons for belief Olson means hypothetical reasons for belief or reasons that are reducible to correctness norms.