On the Defensibility and Believability of Moral Error Theory

Reply to Evers, Streumer, and Toppinen

in Journal of Moral Philosophy
Restricted Access
Get Access to Full Text
Rent on DeepDyve

Have an Access Token?



Enter your access token to activate and access content online.

Please login and go to your personal user account to enter your access token.



Help

Have Institutional Access?



Access content through your institution. Any other coaching guidance?



Connect

This article is a response to critical articles by Daan Evers, Bart Streumer, and Teemu Toppinen on my book Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). I will be concerned with four main topics. I shall first try to illuminate the claim that moral facts are queer, and its role in the argument for moral error theory. In section 2, I discuss the relative merits of moral error theory and moral contextualism. In section 3, I explain why I still find the queerness argument concerning supervenience an unpromising argument against non-naturalistic moral realism. In section 4, finally, I reconsider the question whether I, or anyone, can believe the error theory.

On the Defensibility and Believability of Moral Error Theory

Reply to Evers, Streumer, and Toppinen

in Journal of Moral Philosophy

Sections

References

BoghossianP. 2006. “ What is Relativism?” In Truth and Realism edited by P.Greenough and M.Lynch. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

BykvistK. and J.Olson 2009. “ Expressivism and Moral CertitudePhilosophical Quarterly 59: 20215. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.580.x.

BykvistK. and J. Olson 2012. “Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophywww.jesp.org vol. 6 no. 2.

EversD. 2014. “ Moral Contextualism and the Problem of TrivialityEthical Theory and Moral Practice 17: 28597. doi: 10.1007/s10677-013-9437-0.

EversD. 2016. “ Jonas Olson’s Evidence for Moral Error TheoryJournal of Moral Philosophy 13: 30520. doi 10.1163/17455243-01304002.

FinlayS. 2009. “ Oughts and EndsPhilosophical Studies 143: 31540. doi: 10.1007/s11098-008-9202-8.

FinlayS. 2014. Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

JoyceR. 2001. The Myth of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

LewisD. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.

OlsonJ. 2010. “ The Freshman Objection to Expressivism and What to Make of ItRatio 23: 87101. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2009.00452.x.

OlsonJ. 2014. Moral Error Theory: History Critique Defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

PriceR. 1948. A Review of the Principal Questions of Morals edited by D. D.Raphael. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

StreumerB. 2013. “ Can We Believe the Error Theory?”Journal of Philosophy 110: 194212. doi: 10.5840/jphil2013110431.

StreumerB. 2016. “ Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory EitherJournal of Moral Philosophy 13: 32138. doi 10.1163/17455243-01304003.

StreumerB.forthcoming. Unbelievable Errors. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ToppinenT. 2016. “ Is Irreducible Normativity Impossibly Queer?”Journal of Moral Philosophy 13: 33962. doi 10.1163/17455243-01304004.

1

Lewis 1986: 2.

Information

Content Metrics

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 36 36 29
Full Text Views 94 94 77
PDF Downloads 8 8 4
EPUB Downloads 0 0 0