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 E.g., Singer (1972), (1975), and Regan & Singer (1989).

 Carbonell (2012) argues that practices of moral saints provide evidence that sacrifices that seem too demanding are not as demanding as they may appear. This seems right to me. However, on her view our moral obligations depend on what it would be reasonable for us to believe we are obligated to do. And consequently, the behavior of moral saints may actually change our moral obligations. The view that our moral obligations depend on what would be reasonable for us to believe is highly contentious (as Carbonell admits) and my arguments here do not rely on this controversial principle.

 Walton (1987) describes tu quoque arguments as one kind of circumstantial ad hominem arguments. He writes: “In the tu quoque form of the argument, the criticism is made: ‘You criticize me [or someone else] for doing [action] X, but then you yourself do X.’” (317)