In this essay, I argue that the privileging of romantic and familial ties by those who believe in the liberal state’s right to exclude prospective immigrants cannot be justified. The reasons that count in favour of these relationships count equally in favour of a great array of relationships, from friends to creative collaborators, and whatever else falls in between. The liberal partialist now faces a dilemma, either the scope of the right to exclude is much more limited or much broader than she previously assumed.
See Christopher H. Wellman“Immigration and Freedom of Association,”Ethics119 (2008) pp. 109–141; David Miller “Immigration: The Case for Limits” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics A. Cohen and C. Wellman (eds.) (Malden ma: Blackwell Publishing 2005) pp. 193–206; Ryan Pevnick Immigration and the Constraints of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011) respectively.
See Matthew Lister“Immigration, Association, and the Family,”Law and Philosophy29 (2010) pp. 717–745. See also Matthew Lister “A Rawlsian Argument for Extending Family-Based Immigration Benefits to Same-Sex Couples” The University of Memphis Law Review 37 (2007) pp. 745–780. Christopher Wellman endorses Lister’s account in Debating the Ethics of Immigration p. 92. See also Blake “Immigration Jurisdiction and Exclusion” p. 129.
See for example Nozick“Love's Bond” pp. 68–86; Jennifer E. Whiting “Impersonal Friends” The Monist 74 (1991) pp. 3–29; Neil Delany “Romantic Love and Loving Commitment: Articulating a Modern Ideal” American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1996) pp. 339–356; Niko Kolodny “Love as Valuing a Relationship” The Philosophical Review 112 (2003) pp. 135–89.
See Lawrence Thomas“Friendship,”Synthese72 (1987) pp. 217–236; Nancy Sherman “Aristotle and the Shared Life” in N. K. Badhwar (ed.) Friendship: A Philosophical Reader (Ithaca n.y.: Cornell University press 1993) pp. 91–107; Dean Cocking & Jeanette Kennett “Friendship and the Self” Ethics 108 (1998) pp. 502–527.