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 For example, Roberts (2011) characterizes Blackburn’s (1992) view as follows: “Blackburn holds that there are no thick concepts, only loaded terms, that is, that the evaluative aspect of a so-called thick term is no part of the content of the concept expressed by that term” (p. 495fn14). If instead one uses “thick” Väyrynen’s way, one should say that Blackburn does not deny that there are thick concepts but understands their evaluativeness pragmatically.

 See e.g. Dancy (1993), McNaughton and Rawling (2000) Zangwill (2013), and Alfano and Loeb (2014).

 See Eklund (2013).

 Roberts (2015) also uses the antimoralist to cast doubt on Väyrynen’s argument from projection behavior.

 See Brink (1989).