Moral Perception without (Prior) Moral Knowledge

in Journal of Moral Philosophy
Restricted Access
Get Access to Full Text
Rent on DeepDyve

Have an Access Token?



Enter your access token to activate and access content online.

Please login and go to your personal user account to enter your access token.



Help

Have Institutional Access?



Access content through your institution. Any other coaching guidance?



Connect

Proponents of impure moral perception claim that, while there are perceptual moral experiences, these experiences epistemically depend on a priori moral knowledge. Proponents of pure moral perception claim that moral experiences can justify independently of substantive a priori moral knowledge. Some philosophers, most notably David Faraci (2015), have argued that the pure view is mistaken, since moral perception requires previous moral background knowledge, and such knowledge could not itself be perceptual. I defend pure moral perception against this objection. I consider two ways to understand the notion of “background knowledge” that is crucial to the objection. On a (stronger) reading, the claim that background knowledge is necessary for moral perception is likely false. On a second and weaker reading, the claim is true, but the background knowledge in question could be perceptual, and thus compatible with pure moral perception. Thus, the objection fails.

Moral Perception without (Prior) Moral Knowledge

in Journal of Moral Philosophy

Sections

References

Audi Robert . (2010). “Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge” in the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume84(1) 7997.

Audi Robert . (2013). Moral Perception . Princeton University Press.

Bayne Tim . (2009). “Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content” in Philosophical Quarterly59(236):385404.

BonJour Laurence . (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge . Harvard University Press.

Bruce Vicki Georgeson Mark A. & Green Patrick R. . (2014). Visual Perception: Physiology Psychology and Ecology . 4th Edition. Psychology Press.

Burge Tyler . (2010). Origins of Objectivity . Oxford University Press.

Casati Roberto & Dokic Jerome . (2010). “Sounds” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sounds/.

Chudnoff Elijah . (forthcoming). “Moral Perception: High-Level Perception or Low-Level Intuition?” in Breyer Thiemo & Gutland Christopher (eds.) Phenomenology of Thinking . Routledge.

Conee Earl & Feldman Richard (2001). “Internalism Defended” in American Philosophical Quarterly38(1):118.

Cowan Robert . (2013). “Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism” in European Journal of Philosophy OnlineFirst: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ejop.12031/abstract;jsessionid=C7C599A54EFFB2C4218BEA0880A36526.d03t04.

Cowan Robert . (2014). “Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception” in Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Available at: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13164-014-0185-4.

Cowan Robert . (2015). “Perceptual Intuitionism” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research90(1):164193.

Faraci David . (2015). “A Hard Look at Moral Perception” in Philosophical Studies . Online First: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098-014-0397-6.

FitzPatrick William . (forthcoming). “Debunking Evolutionary Debunking of Ethical Realism” in Philosophical Studies . Online First: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098-014-0295-y.

Gibson James J. (1977). “The Theory of Affordances” in Shaw Robert E. and Bransford John (eds.). Perceiving acting and knowing: toward an ecological psychology . Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Harman Gilbert . (1977). The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics . Oxford University Press.

Helmholtz H. von. (1866/1911). Treatise on Physiological Optics . Rochester ny: Optical Society of America.

Huang Yanping & Rao. Rajesh P. N. (2011). “Predictive Coding” in WIREs Cognitive Science2:580593.

Huemer Michael . (2001). Skepticism and the Veil of Perception . Lahnam: Rowman & Littlefield.

Huemer Michael . (2008). “Revisionary Intuitionism” in Social Philosophy and Policy25(1):368392.

Johnston Mark . (2001). “The Authority of Affect” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research63(1):181214.

Joyce Richard . (2006). The Evolution of Morality . mit Press.

McBrayer Justin . (2010a). “A Limited Defense of Moral Perception”Philosophical Studies149(3) 305320.

McBrayer Justin . (2010b). “Moral Perception and the Causal Objection”Ratio23(3) 291307.

McNaughton David . (1988). Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics . Blackwell.

Millikan Ruth . (1984). Language Thought and Other Biological Categories . mit Press.

Pappas George . (2014). “Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/.

Phelps Elizabeth A. Ling Sam and Carrasco Marisa . (2006). “Emotion Facilitates Perception and Potentiates the Perceptual Benefits of Attention” in Psychological Science17(4):292299.

Rescorla Michael . (2015). “Bayesian Perceptual Psychology” in Matthen Mohan (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception . Oxford University Press.

Roeser Sabine . (2011). Moral Emotions and Intuitions . Palgrave Macmillan.

Scholl Brian J. (2005). “Innateness and (Bayesian) Visual Perception” in Carruthers Peter (ed.) The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents . Oxford University Press.

Siegel Susanna . (2010). The Contents of Visual Experience . Oxford University Press.

Siegel Susanna . (2014). “Affordances and the Contents of Perception” in Brogaard Berit (ed.) Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press.

Star Daniel . (2008). “Moral Knowledge, Epistemic Externalism, and Intuitionism”Ratio21(3):329343.

Street Sharon . (2006). “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” in Philosophical Studies127(1):109166.

Sturgeon Nicholas . (2002). “Ethical Intuitionism and Ethical Naturalism” in Stratton-Lake Phillip (ed.) Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations. Oxford University Press.

Värynen Pekka . (forthcoming). “Doubts about Moral Perception”.

Vavova Katia . (2015). “Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism” in Philosophy Compass10:104116.

Wedgwood Ralph . (2001). “Sensing values?” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research63(1):215223.

Wedgwood Ralph . (2002). “Internalism Explained” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research65(2):349369.

Werner Preston J. (forthcoming). “A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism and the Problem of Cognitive Penetrability” in European Journal of Philosophy.

Werner Richard . (1983). “Ethical Realism” in Ethics 93(4):653679.

Wielenberg Erik J. (2014). Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism . Oxford University Press.

Werner Preston J. (2016). “Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience” in Journal of Moral Philosophy13(3):294317.

Index Card

Content Metrics

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 56 56 14
Full Text Views 11 11 10
PDF Downloads 3 3 3
EPUB Downloads 2 2 2