According to perspectivism about moral obligation, our obligations are affected by our epistemic circumstances. But how exactly should this claim be understood? On Zimmerman’s “Prospective View,” perspectivism is spelled out as the thesis that an option is obligatory if and only if it maximizes what Zimmerman calls “prospective value,” which is in turn determined by the agent’s present evidence. In this article, I raise two objections to this approach. Firstly, I argue that spelling out the difference between perspectivism and anti-perspectivism in terms of value creates a number of problems that can be avoided by an account that proceeds in terms of reasons. Secondly, I argue that Zimmerman focuses on the wrong body of evidence, and that this commits him to an implausible solution to the problem that perspectivists face with regard to advice from better-informed sources.
BykvistKrister. 2011. ‘How to Do Wrong Knowingly and Get Away with It’ in Neither/Nor. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday31–47. Uppsala Philosophical Studies 58. Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
KiesewetterBenjamin. 2018. ‘How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence’ in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical edited by McHughConorWayJonathan and WhitingDaniel90–114.Oxford: Oxford University Press.