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The past is full of terrible tragedies, including slavery, World War I, and the Holocaust. Morality would clearly appear to support the preference that the victims of those calamities would have lived free and peaceful lives. And yet, a puzzle or even a paradox appears to be lurking here. Moral evaluation can be either personal or impersonal, yet neither one of these two perspectives, nor any other prevalent moral evaluation of events, appears to yield the morally expected conclusion. To the best of my knowledge this puzzle has not been discussed before. If there is no way to escape this surprising conclusion, then morality appears to be much more grim and unsympathetic than we normally think.
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Adams Robert Merrihew 2009. “Love and the Problem of Evil,” in Tabensky Pedro Alexis , ed., The Positive Function of Evil. Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
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Smilansky Saul (2013b). “Free Will as a Case of ‘Crazy Ethics’,” in Caruso Gregg , ed., Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books.
Smilansky Saul (2016). “Gratitude: The Dark Side,” in Carr David , ed., Perspectives on Gratitude. New York: Routledge.
Smilansky Saul (2019). “The Good, the Bad, and the Nonidentity Problem: Reflections on Jewish History,” in Jewish Philosophy in an Analytic Age, Lebens Sam , Rabinowitz Dani and Segal Aaron , eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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The past is full of terrible tragedies, including slavery, World War I, and the Holocaust. Morality would clearly appear to support the preference that the victims of those calamities would have lived free and peaceful lives. And yet, a puzzle or even a paradox appears to be lurking here. Moral evaluation can be either personal or impersonal, yet neither one of these two perspectives, nor any other prevalent moral evaluation of events, appears to yield the morally expected conclusion. To the best of my knowledge this puzzle has not been discussed before. If there is no way to escape this surprising conclusion, then morality appears to be much more grim and unsympathetic than we normally think.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 467 | 75 | 13 |
Full Text Views | 47 | 6 | 1 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 74 | 10 | 0 |