Why the All-Affected Principle Is Groundless
In: Journal of Moral PhilosophySearch for other papers by Andreas Bengtson in
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Search for other papers by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen in
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Abstract
The all-affected principle is a widely accepted solution to the problem of constituting the demos. Despite its popularity, a basic question in relation to the principle has not received much attention: why does the fact that an individual is affected by a certain decision ground a right to inclusion in democratic decision-making about that matter? An answer to this question must include a reason that explains why an affected individual should be included because she is affected. We identify three such reasons in the literature – to wit, interest protection, self-government and welfare – and show why they all fail. We then propose two alternative reasons, equal relations and fairness, and show why they are also deficient. Surprisingly, the all-affected principle then appears groundless, which supports withholding belief in the all-affected principle or(/and) investing future research in identifying the thus-far unidentified reason why being affected grounds a claim to inclusion.
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| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 641 | 292 | 27 |
| Full Text Views | 298 | 241 | 6 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 591 | 459 | 19 |
Why the All-Affected Principle Is Groundless
In: Journal of Moral PhilosophySearch for other papers by Andreas Bengtson in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Search for other papers by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
The all-affected principle is a widely accepted solution to the problem of constituting the demos. Despite its popularity, a basic question in relation to the principle has not received much attention: why does the fact that an individual is affected by a certain decision ground a right to inclusion in democratic decision-making about that matter? An answer to this question must include a reason that explains why an affected individual should be included because she is affected. We identify three such reasons in the literature – to wit, interest protection, self-government and welfare – and show why they all fail. We then propose two alternative reasons, equal relations and fairness, and show why they are also deficient. Surprisingly, the all-affected principle then appears groundless, which supports withholding belief in the all-affected principle or(/and) investing future research in identifying the thus-far unidentified reason why being affected grounds a claim to inclusion.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 641 | 292 | 27 |
| Full Text Views | 298 | 241 | 6 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 591 | 459 | 19 |