Expressivism, Deflationism and Correspondence

in Journal of Moral Philosophy
Beschränkter Zugang
Zugriff auf gesamten Text erhalten
Auf DeepDyve mieten

Have an Access Token?



Enter your access token to activate and access content online.

Please login and go to your personal user account to enter your access token.



Help

Have Institutional Access?



Access content through your institution. Any other coaching guidance?



Connect

Abstract

On an expressivist view, ethical claims are not fact stating; instead they serve the alternative function of expressing our feelings, attitudes and values. On a deflationary view, truth is not a property with a nature to be analyzed, but merely a grammatical device to aid us in endorsing sentences. Views on the relationship between expressivism and deflationism vary widely: they are compatible; they are incompatible; they are a natural pair; they doom one another. Here I explain some of these views, extract some necessary distinctions, and put these to use for understanding expressivism. I argue that contrary to the opinions of some, deflationism doesn’t help with problems of objectivity, knowledge and reasoning in ethics. I suggest alternative expressivist treatments of these problems, and show how expressivism as a metaethical view must have consequences for our ethical lives and beliefs. In particular it must affect the way we deal with ethical consistency—when norms or beliefs conflict—and ethical incompleteness—when ethical questions have no right answer.

Expressivism, Deflationism and Correspondence

in Journal of Moral Philosophy

Überschriften

Index Card

Kennzahlen

Kennzahlen

Insgesamt Im letzten Jahr In den letzten 30 Tagen
Aufrufe von Kurzbeschreibungen 26 26 2
Gesamttextansichten 47 47 0
PDF-Downloads 11 11 0
EPUB-Downloads 0 0 0