Moral and Theological Realism: The Explanatory Argument

in Journal of Moral Philosophy
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Abstract

There are striking parallels, largely unexplored in the literature, between skeptical arguments against theism and against moral realism. After sketching four arguments meant to do this double duty, I restrict my attention to an explanatory argument that claims that we have most reason to deny the existence of moral facts (and so, by extrapolation, theistic ones), because such putative facts have no causal-explanatory power. I reject the proposed parity, and offer reasons to think that the potential vulnerabilities of moral realism on this front are quite different from those of the theist.

Moral and Theological Realism: The Explanatory Argument

in Journal of Moral Philosophy

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