Practical Reason, Value and Action
In: Journal of Moral PhilosophySearch for other papers by Alison Hills in
Current site
Google Scholar
Abstract
How should we decide which theory of practical reason is correct? One possibility is to link each conception of practical reason with a theory of value, and to assess the first in combination with the second. Recently some philosophers have taken a different approach. They have tried to link theories of practical reason with theories of action instead. I try to show that it can be illuminating to think of practical reason in terms of the success conditions of action, but ultimately this is in addition to, rather than a substitute for, relating practical reason to value as well. I set out three different conceptions of action and corresponding success conditions, and explain how each is linked to a particular conception of practical reason and, in two cases, to a theory of value too. My goal is to describe these different accounts, rather than to defend any in particular, though I will suggest that some are more satisfactory than others.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 622 | 113 | 18 |
| Full Text Views | 93 | 3 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 90 | 10 | 1 |
Practical Reason, Value and Action
In: Journal of Moral PhilosophySearch for other papers by Alison Hills in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
How should we decide which theory of practical reason is correct? One possibility is to link each conception of practical reason with a theory of value, and to assess the first in combination with the second. Recently some philosophers have taken a different approach. They have tried to link theories of practical reason with theories of action instead. I try to show that it can be illuminating to think of practical reason in terms of the success conditions of action, but ultimately this is in addition to, rather than a substitute for, relating practical reason to value as well. I set out three different conceptions of action and corresponding success conditions, and explain how each is linked to a particular conception of practical reason and, in two cases, to a theory of value too. My goal is to describe these different accounts, rather than to defend any in particular, though I will suggest that some are more satisfactory than others.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 622 | 113 | 18 |
| Full Text Views | 93 | 3 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 90 | 10 | 1 |