Deontological Restrictions and the Good/Bad Asymmetry

in Journal of Moral Philosophy
Restricted Access
Get Access to Full Text
Rent on DeepDyve

Have an Access Token?



Enter your access token to activate and access content online.

Please login and go to your personal user account to enter your access token.



Help

Have Institutional Access?



Access content through your institution. Any other coaching guidance?



Connect

Abstract

I argue that a defense of deontological restrictions need not resort to what I call the 'Good/Bad asymmetry', according to which it is morally more important to avoid harming others than to prevent just such harm. I replace this paradoxical asymmetry with two non-paradoxical (if also non-obvious) ones. These are the following: (a) We ought to treat an act of preventing harm to persons precisely as such (as a harm prevention), rather than as the causing of a benefit; but we ought to treat an act that causes harm precisely as such (as a harm causing), rather than as the prevention of a benefit. (b) It is morally more important not to cause harm than to cause benefit. I show how we can use those asymmetries, together with certain other assumptions, to defend restrictions. I also offer a partial defense of the first of the two asymmetries.

Deontological Restrictions and the Good/Bad Asymmetry

in Journal of Moral Philosophy

Sections

Index Card

Content Metrics

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 6 6 5
Full Text Views 4 4 4
PDF Downloads 2 2 2
EPUB Downloads 0 0 0