Cognitive Biases and Moral Luck

in Journal of Moral Philosophy
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Abstract

Some of the recent philosophical literature on moral luck attempts to make headway in the moral-luck debate by employing the resources of empirical psychology, in effect arguing that some of the intuitive judgments relevant to the moral-luck debate are best explained – and so presumably explained away – as the output of well-documented cognitive biases. We argue that such attempts are empirically problematic, and furthermore that even if they were not, it is still not at all clear what philosophical significance they would have.

Cognitive Biases and Moral Luck

in Journal of Moral Philosophy

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