Cognitive Biases and Moral Luck
In: Journal of Moral PhilosophySearch for other papers by Ehud Guttel in
Current site
Google Scholar
Search for other papers by David Enoch in
Current site
Google Scholar
Abstract
Some of the recent philosophical literature on moral luck attempts to make headway in the moral-luck debate by employing the resources of empirical psychology, in effect arguing that some of the intuitive judgments relevant to the moral-luck debate are best explained – and so presumably explained away – as the output of well-documented cognitive biases. We argue that such attempts are empirically problematic, and furthermore that even if they were not, it is still not at all clear what philosophical significance they would have.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 717 | 45 | 4 |
| Full Text Views | 192 | 5 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 136 | 15 | 1 |
Cognitive Biases and Moral Luck
In: Journal of Moral PhilosophySearch for other papers by Ehud Guttel in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Search for other papers by David Enoch in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
Some of the recent philosophical literature on moral luck attempts to make headway in the moral-luck debate by employing the resources of empirical psychology, in effect arguing that some of the intuitive judgments relevant to the moral-luck debate are best explained – and so presumably explained away – as the output of well-documented cognitive biases. We argue that such attempts are empirically problematic, and furthermore that even if they were not, it is still not at all clear what philosophical significance they would have.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 717 | 45 | 4 |
| Full Text Views | 192 | 5 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 136 | 15 | 1 |