Central to the freedom of association is the freedom to exclude. In fact, American constitutional law permits associations to discriminate on otherwise prohibited grounds, a principle of expressive discrimination or what I call "expressive exclusion." However, we lack a complete normative defense of it. Too often, expressive exclusion is justifi ed as a simple case of religious accommodation, or a simple case of freedom of association or speech—justifi cations that are defi cient. I argue that expressive exclusion is essential in creating genuine space for democratic dissent. It stands at the intersection of speech, association, and democracy.
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All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
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Central to the freedom of association is the freedom to exclude. In fact, American constitutional law permits associations to discriminate on otherwise prohibited grounds, a principle of expressive discrimination or what I call "expressive exclusion." However, we lack a complete normative defense of it. Too often, expressive exclusion is justifi ed as a simple case of religious accommodation, or a simple case of freedom of association or speech—justifi cations that are defi cient. I argue that expressive exclusion is essential in creating genuine space for democratic dissent. It stands at the intersection of speech, association, and democracy.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 478 | 146 | 12 |
Full Text Views | 135 | 5 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 67 | 7 | 0 |