Is Forgiveness the Deliberate Refusal to Punish?

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
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  • 1 University of Arizona Tucson, USA

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In his paper, “The Paradox of Forgiveness” (this Journal 6 (2009), p. 365-393), Leo Zaibert defends the novel and interesting claim that to forgive is deliberately to refuse to punish. I argue that this is mistaken.

  • 1

    Leo Zaibert, ‘The Paradox of Forgiveness,’ Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2009), pp. 365-393.

  • 6

    Zaibert, ‘The Paradox of Forgiveness’, p. 387.

  • 8

    Ibid., p. 387.

  • 9

    Ibid., p. 385.

  • 10

    Ibid., p. 387.

  • 17

     Cf. Joel Feinberg, Doing & Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970): “It is an essential and intended element of punishment […] that the victim be made to suffer and of liability that he be made to pay; these are not mere regrettable derivatives of the undertakings, but rather their termini ad quem.”

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