Is Forgiveness the Deliberate Refusal to Punish?

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Author: Brandon Warmke 1
View More View Less
  • 1 University of Arizona Tucson, USA
Online Publication Date:
01 Jan 2011
In:
Volume 8: Issue 4
Article Type:
Research Article
Pages:
613–620
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1163/174552411X601085
Keywords:
forgiveness; intention; overt blame; private blame; punishment

Purchase instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):

€29.95$34.95
Add to Cart
Rent on DeepDyve
Redeem Access Token

In his paper, “The Paradox of Forgiveness” (this Journal 6 (2009), p. 365-393), Leo Zaibert defends the novel and interesting claim that to forgive is deliberately to refuse to punish. I argue that this is mistaken.

In:
Journal of Moral Philosophy
E-ISSN:
1745-5243
Print ISSN:
1740-4681
Publisher:
Brill
Cover Journal of Moral Philosophy
  • 1

     Leo Zaibert, ‘The Paradox of Forgiveness,’ Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2009), pp. 365-393.

  • 6

     Zaibert, ‘The Paradox of Forgiveness’, p. 387.

  • 8

     Ibid., p. 387.

  • 9

     Ibid., p. 385.

  • 10

     Ibid., p. 387.

  • 17

     Cf. Joel Feinberg, Doing & Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970): “It is an essential and intended element of punishment […] that the victim be made to suffer and of liability that he be made to pay; these are not mere regrettable derivatives of the undertakings, but rather their termini ad quem.”

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 231 122 6
Full Text Views 94 7 2
PDF Views & Downloads 23 4 2