Expressivist Explanations
In: Journal of Moral PhilosophySearch for other papers by Neil Sinclair in
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In this paper I argue that the common practice of employing moral predicates as explaining phrases can be accommodated on an expressivist account of moral practice. This account does not treat moral explanations as in any way second-rate or derivative, since it subsumes moral explanations under the general theory of program explanations (as defended by Jackson and Pettit). It follows that the phenomenon of moral explanations cannot be used to adjudicate the debate between expressivism and its rivals.
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2
See D. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chapter 2 and R. Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), chapter 1.
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4
M. Timmons, Morality without Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), chapter 1.
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5
G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Philosophy 33 (1958), pp. 1-19.
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6
See C.L. Stevenson, Facts and Values: Studies in Ethical Analysis (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 11 & 117; S. Darwall, A. Gibbard and P. Railton, ‘Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends’, Philosophical Review 101 (1992), pp. 115-89, p.127; A.J. Ayer, ‘The Analysis of Moral Judgements’, in A.J Ayer, Philosophical Essays (London: Macmillan, 1954), pp. 231-49, pp. 231-3.
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9
A. Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 124.
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10
See D. Wiggins, ‘Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Beliefs’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1990), pp. 61-86; S. Rieber, ‘Scepticism and Contrastative Explanation’, Noûs 32 (1998), pp. 189-204; C. Jenkins, ‘Knowledge and Explanation’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2006), pp. 137-64.
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11
N. Sturgeon, ‘Contents and Causes: A Reply to Blackburn’, Philosophical Studies 61 (1991), pp. 19-37, fn. 16.
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12
N. Sturgeon, ‘What Difference Does it Make if Moral Realism is True?’, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 24 (1986), pp. 115-42.
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17
S. Blackburn, ‘Just Causes’, Philosophical Studies 61 (1991), pp. 3-17, p.11. See also Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, p. 186.
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18
See Blackburn, Spreading the Word, pp. 182-84. This is a non-metaphysical version of the supervenience claim: see Darwall, Gibbard and Railton, ‘Toward Fin de siècle Ethics…’, fn. 125.
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21
Blackburn, ‘Supervenience Revisited’, p. 162. Note that if a third party doesn’t know the agent’s moral standards, such an explanation will be completely vacuous since there will be no way of knowing whether the actual belief diverges from the endorsed standard.
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24
N. Sturgeon, ‘Thomson against Moral Explanations’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998). pp. 199-206, p. 201.
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26
N. Sturgeon, ‘Nonmoral Explanations’, Philosophical Perspectives 6, Ethics (1992), pp. 97-117, p. 103.
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27
See F. Jackson and P. Pettit, ‘Functionalism and Broad Content’, Mind 97 (1988), pp. 381-400 and ‘Program Explanation: A General Perspective’, Analysis 50 (1990). pp. 107-17.
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35
A. Gibbard, Thinking How to Live (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 48-53.
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46
See A. Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), pp. 150-55 & 168-74; M. Nelson, ‘Moral Realism and Program Explanation’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2006), pp. 417-428; A. Miller, ‘Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to Nelson’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2009), pp. 337-41; P. Bloomfield, ‘Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 2: Reply to Miller’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2009), pp. 343-44.
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47
Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics, p. 173, Nelson, ‘Moral Realism and Program Explanation’, pp. 423-24. Miller and Nelson also agree that “an explanation is ‘best’ if its unavailability would lead to genuine explanatory loss”; see Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics, p. 296.
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48
Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics, pp. 173-74; Nelson, ‘Moral Realism and Program Explanation’, pp. 423-28.
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50
Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism, p. 8. See also Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, pp. 107-8 and Thinking How to Live, p. 181.
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Expressivist Explanations
In: Journal of Moral PhilosophySearch for other papers by Neil Sinclair in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
In this paper I argue that the common practice of employing moral predicates as explaining phrases can be accommodated on an expressivist account of moral practice. This account does not treat moral explanations as in any way second-rate or derivative, since it subsumes moral explanations under the general theory of program explanations (as defended by Jackson and Pettit). It follows that the phenomenon of moral explanations cannot be used to adjudicate the debate between expressivism and its rivals.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 282 | 38 | 6 |
| Full Text Views | 65 | 0 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 67 | 2 | 0 |