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Costs do not Explain Trust among Secular Groups
In: Journal of Cognition and CultureAbstract
Many human groups achieve high levels of trust and cooperation, but these achievements are vulnerable to exploitation. Several theorists have suggested that when groups impose costs on their members, these costs can function to limit freeriding, and hence promote trust and cooperation. While a substantial body of experimental research has demonstrated a positive relationship between costs and cooperation in religious groups, to date, this relationship has not held for secular groups. Here we extend this line of research by comparing trust and cooperation among 11 secular groups, including four
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Costs do not Explain Trust among Secular Groups
In: Journal of Cognition and CultureAbstract
Many human groups achieve high levels of trust and cooperation, but these achievements are vulnerable to exploitation. Several theorists have suggested that when groups impose costs on their members, these costs can function to limit freeriding, and hence promote trust and cooperation. While a substantial body of experimental research has demonstrated a positive relationship between costs and cooperation in religious groups, to date, this relationship has not held for secular groups. Here we extend this line of research by comparing trust and cooperation among 11 secular groups, including four
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 504 | 76 | 4 |
| Full Text Views | 206 | 2 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 46 | 4 | 0 |