Many people feel the pull of both creationism and evolution as explanations for the origin of species, despite the direct contradiction. Some respond by endorsing theistic evolution, integrating the scientific and religious explanations by positing that God initiated or guided the process of evolution. Others, however, simultaneously endorse both evolution and creationism despite the contradiction. Here, we illustrate this puzzling phenomenon with interviews with a diverse sample. This qualitative data reveals several approaches to coping with simultaneous inconsistent explanations. For example, some people seem to manage this contradiction by separating out ideological claims, which prioritize identity expression, from fact claims, which prioritize truth. Fitting with this interpretation, ambivalent individuals tended to call explanations “beliefs” (not knowledge), avoid mention of truth or falsity, and ground one or both beliefs in identity and personal history. We conclude with a brief discussion of the affordances of this distinction.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
Brem, S. K.; Ranney, M.; and Schindel, J. (2003). “Perceived consequences of evolution: College students perceive negative personal and social impact in evolutionary theory.” Science Education 87, 181–206.
Buckwalter, W.; Rose, D.; and Turri, J. (2013). “Belief through thick and thin.” Nous, 49(4), 748–775.
Everhart, D. and Hameed, S. (2013). “Muslims and evolution: A study of Pakistani physicians in the United States.” Evolution: Education and Outreach 6(2), 1–8.
Gallup, Inc. (2014). “Evolution, creationism, and intelligent design.” Retrieved 22/7/2013 from http://www.gallup.com/poll/21814/evolution-creationism-intelligent-design.aspx.
Gendler, T. S. (2008). “Alief and belief.” The Journal of Philosophy 105(10), 634–663.
Gervais, J. M. (2015). “Override the controversy: Analytic thinking predicts endorsement of evolution.” Cognition 142, 312–321.
Goldberg, R. F.; and Thompson-Schill, S. (2009). “Developmental ‘roots’ in mature biological knowledge.” Psychological Science 20(4), 480–487.
Heiphetz, L.; Spelke, E. S.; Harris, P. L.; & Banaji, M. R. (2013). “The development of reasoning about beliefs: Fact, preference, and ideology.” J Exp Soc Psych 49(3), 559–565.
Heiphetz, L.; Spelke, E. S.; Harris, P. L.; & Banaji, M. R. (2014). “What do different beliefs tell us? An examination of factual, opinion-based, and religious beliefs.” Cognitive Development, 30, 15–29.
Hill, J. (2014). “Rejecting evolution: The role of religion, education, and social networks.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 53(3), 575–594.
Kahan, D. (2015). “The expressive rationality of inaccurate perceptions.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40, 26–28.
Kelemen, D.; & Rosset, E. (2009). “The human function compunction: Teleological explanation in adults.” Cognition 111(1), 138–143.
Kelemen, D.; Rottman, J.; & Seston, R. (2013). “Professional physical scientists display tenacious teleological tendencies: Purpose-based reasoning as a cognitive default.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142(4), 1074–1983.
Legare, C. H.; Evans, E. M.; Rosengren, K. S.; & Harris, P. L. (2012). “The coexistence of natural and supernatural explanations across cultures and development.” Child Development 83(3), 779–793.
Liquin, E.; Metz, S. E.; & Lombrozo, T. A. (2020). “Science demands explanation, religion tolerates mystery.” Cognition.
Lombrozo, T. A.; Thanukos, A.; & Weisberg, M. (2007). “The importance of understanding the nature of science for the acceptance of evolution.” Evolution: Education and Outreach 1, 290–298.
Metz, S. E.; Weisberg, D. S.; & Weisberg, M. (2018). “Non-scientific criteria for belief sustain counter-scientific beliefs.” Cognitive Science, 1–27. doi: 10.1111/cogs.12584.
Miller, J. D.; Scott, E. C.; & Okamoto, S. (2006). “Public acceptance of evolution.” Science 313, 765–766.
Pew Research Center. (November 3, 2015). “U. S. public becoming less religious: Chapter 4: Social and political attitudes.” Source: 2014 Religious Landscape study, conducted June 4–Sept 30, 2014. http://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/chapter-4-social-and-politicalattitudes/.
Shtulman, A.; & Calabi, P. (2008). “Learning, understanding, and acceptance: The case of evolution.” Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society 30, 235–240.
Shtulman, A.; & Calabi, P. (2013). “Tuition vs. intuition: Effects of instruction on naïve theories of evolution.” Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 59(2), 141–167. doi:10.1353/mpq.2013.0010.
Shtulman, A.; & Valcarcel, J. (2012). “Scientific knowledge suppresses but does not supplant earlier intuitions.” Cognition 2, 209–215.
Storch, E. A.; Roberti, J. W.; Bravata, E.; & Storch, J. B. (2004). “Psychometric investigation of the Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire – Short-Form.” Pastoral Psychology 52(6), 479–483.
Tetlock, P. E. (2002). “Social functionalist frameworks for judgment and choice: Intuitive politicians, theologians, and prosecutors.” Psychological Review 109(3), 451–471.
Van Leeuwen, N. (2014). Religious credence is not factual belief. Cognition, 133, 698–715.
Weisberg, D. S.; Landrum, Asheley; Metz, S. E.; & Weisberg, M. E. (2018). “No missing link: Knowledge predicts acceptance of evolution in the United States.” Bioscience, 68(3), 212–222.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 634 | 89 | 3 |
Full Text Views | 39 | 4 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 54 | 7 | 0 |
Many people feel the pull of both creationism and evolution as explanations for the origin of species, despite the direct contradiction. Some respond by endorsing theistic evolution, integrating the scientific and religious explanations by positing that God initiated or guided the process of evolution. Others, however, simultaneously endorse both evolution and creationism despite the contradiction. Here, we illustrate this puzzling phenomenon with interviews with a diverse sample. This qualitative data reveals several approaches to coping with simultaneous inconsistent explanations. For example, some people seem to manage this contradiction by separating out ideological claims, which prioritize identity expression, from fact claims, which prioritize truth. Fitting with this interpretation, ambivalent individuals tended to call explanations “beliefs” (not knowledge), avoid mention of truth or falsity, and ground one or both beliefs in identity and personal history. We conclude with a brief discussion of the affordances of this distinction.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 634 | 89 | 3 |
Full Text Views | 39 | 4 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 54 | 7 | 0 |