The Institution as an Explanatory Mechanism in Cultural Evolution: A Review of Three Theories
In: Journal of Cognition and CultureCenter for the Study of Human Nature, California State University, Fullerton Fullerton, CA USA
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to stimulate productive research on institutions from within cultural evolutionary science and, especially, philosophy of science. It aims to achieve this goal by distinguishing between three types of question a theory of institutions ought to answer; by comparing and analyzing three theories of institutions; and by raising, for each theory, potential challenges and questions. Theories analyzed include a cognitive psychological theory, an ecological theory, and self-interested enforcement theory. Common features of the theories are identified where possible. Emphasis is placed on stating constructive criticisms and research questions. The paper concludes with comments about the uncertain ontology of institutions and about consequences of building cultural evolutionary theories of institutions on formal models of institutions.
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| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 232 | 51 | 8 |
| Full Text Views | 23 | 4 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 74 | 11 | 0 |
The Institution as an Explanatory Mechanism in Cultural Evolution: A Review of Three Theories
In: Journal of Cognition and CultureCenter for the Study of Human Nature, California State University, Fullerton Fullerton, CA USA
Search for other papers by Ryan Nichols in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to stimulate productive research on institutions from within cultural evolutionary science and, especially, philosophy of science. It aims to achieve this goal by distinguishing between three types of question a theory of institutions ought to answer; by comparing and analyzing three theories of institutions; and by raising, for each theory, potential challenges and questions. Theories analyzed include a cognitive psychological theory, an ecological theory, and self-interested enforcement theory. Common features of the theories are identified where possible. Emphasis is placed on stating constructive criticisms and research questions. The paper concludes with comments about the uncertain ontology of institutions and about consequences of building cultural evolutionary theories of institutions on formal models of institutions.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 232 | 51 | 8 |
| Full Text Views | 23 | 4 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 74 | 11 | 0 |