The Folk Concepts of Intention and Intentional Action: A Cross-Cultural Study

in Journal of Cognition and Culture
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Abstract

Recent studies point to a surprising divergence between people's use of the concept of intention and their use of the concept of acting intentionally. It seems that people's application of the concept of intention is determined by their beliefs about the agent's psychological states whereas their use of the concept of acting intentionally is determined at least in part by their beliefs about the moral status of the behavior itself (i.e., by their beliefs about whether the behavior is morally good or morally bad). These findings raise a number of difficult questions about the relationship between the concept of intention and the concept of acting intentionally. The present paper addresses those questions using a variety of different methods, including conceptual analysis, psychological experimentation, and an examination of people's use of certain expressions in other languages.

The Folk Concepts of Intention and Intentional Action: A Cross-Cultural Study

in Journal of Cognition and Culture

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