1 1Cedric de Coning is a Research Fellow at ACCORD where he is an advisor to the Training for Peace in Africa and the African Civil-Military Coordination programmes. He is a DPhil student with the Department of Political Science at the University of Stellenbosch.
I The exception is the DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) Policy on Civil-Military Coordination (UN DPKO, 2002).
2 This definition of peacebuilding was first formulated by the author and Senzo Ngubane for an ACCORD study on Peacebuilding in Southern Africa commissioned by JICA in 2004. It was subsequently further refined by the author for the African Post-Conffict Reconstruction Framework developed by ACCORD for the Peace and Security Programme of the NEPAD Secretariat (NEPAD, 2005).
3 There are various different interpretations of these phases, but most convey the same essen- tial progression from violent conflict to normalisation, e.g. the Association of the U.S. Army & Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C. published a Post- Conflict Reconstruction: Task Framework in 2002, in which they identify three stages, namely: the initial response, transformation and fostering sustainability.
4 The drawing down of the UN peace operations in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and East Timor (UNMISET), and the establishment of UN peacebuilding officers in their place, are two con- temporary examples.
5 The NATO definition of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is the co-ordination and co-oper- ation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil populations, includ- ing national and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-govemmental organisations and agencies (NATO, 2000:1). 6 The EU definition of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is the co-ordination and co-opera- tion, in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations and civil role-players (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agen- cies." (EU, 2002:9). 7 CMO is the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and non governmental civilian organisations and
authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil- military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be per- formed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces (See US military publications: JP 3-57, FM 41-10 & JP 1-02).
8 See for instance the UN Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) Guidelines on the Functioning of the Resident Coordinator System, 24 September 1999 and the UN Secretary- General's Note of Guidance on Relations between Representatives of the Secretary General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators, dated 11 December 2000. 9 See for instance the different types of integrated missions (separate, partial and full integra- tion) identified by the Report on Integrated Missions (Barth Eide et al., 2005:9).
10 The Oslo Guidelines, the guidelines on the use of MCDA in complex emergencies, the guide- lines on the use of armed and military escorts, the DPKO Civil-Military Coordination Policy of 2002, and the IASC reference paper.
I I The Guidelines for complex emergencies (OCHA, 2003) differentiate between direct, indirect and infrastructure support. The more visibly direct the support the more likely it is that the association with the military may endanger the beneficiaries or the humanitarian actors.
12 The UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) has made an attempt to provide policy guidance to military units, but at the time of writing this draft policy document was still being debated at the mission management level in Kinshasa and at the headquarters level in New York and Geneva. 13 Refer to the peacekeeping section of the UN website (www.un.org) for the most recent rank- ings of UN Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs).
14 In some UN peace operations, e.g. Haiti and Sudan, there are civilian civil-military coordi- nation officers that use the same terminology reserved for humanitarian civil-military coordi- nation officers, namely 'CMCoord' officers. These officers are also sometimes referred to as 'CIMCoord' officers, but this does not appear to be a conscious attempt to differentiate them from 'CMCoord' officers, but rather just a more phonetic spelling of the way 'CMCoord' is pronounced. Most military civil-military coordination officers in UN peace operations are referred to as 'CIMIC officers'. However, the IASC Reference Paper (IASC, 2004:11) has allocated the term 'Civil-Military Liaison Officers (CMLO)' for DPKO, and although DPKO has not yet taken a decision on whether or not to use this term, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) seems to have started to use the CMLO terminology.
15 Espen Barth Eide, presentation delivered at the 'DDR from a Peacebuilding Perspective' Course, 19-24 January 2004, Norwegian Defence International Center (NODEFIC). 16 With apologies to the definition of coherence on p. 4 of the Henry Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue's February 2003 report: Politics and Humanitarianism: Coherence in Crisis?: "Coherence came to mean: the effort, notably by the UN and some donors, to ensure that all international aid and interventions in a particular crisis are directed towards a com- mon objective."
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