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On Compatibility between Presentism and Anti-Presentism in History of Science

In: Journal of the Philosophy of History
Author:
Karoliina Pulkkinen Postdoctoral Researcher, Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki Helsinki Finland

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https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4976-8216
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Abstract

Presentism – the influence of the present on historians’ work – has been met with resistance among historians of science; many hold that excessive reference to the present can compromise the aim of understanding past practices in their own terms. In response to this concern, a number of authors have argued that not only is such influence inevitable, it can also be legitimate and helpful. In probing into the presentist and anti-presentist positions in histories of science, I argue here that there is a much larger degree of compatibility between the two positions than has been previously acknowledged. Building on recent work on legitimate forms of presentism, I argue that at least three types of presentism – empirical presentism, motivational presentism, critical presentism – display compatibility with anti-presentism, insofar as certain pitfalls of presentism are kept in mind.

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