The Incompatibility of Phenomenological Data and Dominant Nosological Systems Like DSM-5: Binswanger’s Psychopathological Phenomenology
In: Journal of Phenomenological PsychologySearch for other papers by Albert-Jan van de Pol in
Current site
Google Scholar
Search for other papers by Jan Derksen in
Current site
Google Scholar
Abstract
This essay is a response to proposals to integrate patient-subjective or idiographic data into future versions of nosologies such as the DSM and the ICD. It argues that a nosology is not a suitable vehicle for disseminating psychopathological-phenomenological research results throughout the field. Drawing on the work of Ludwig Binswanger, it examines, on the basis of four postulates, how he applies the Husserlian concept of intentionality in psychiatry and thus arrives at a psychopathological phenomenology. For each individual postulate, we then look in depth at the implications for the current debate around DSM. The conclusion we come to is that, both because of the objective of phenomenological research and because of the complexity of the kind of information involved in findings based on that research, it is impossible to integrate these findings into a nosology without deviating from either them or the nosology itself.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
-
American Psychiatric Association (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th edition). Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association (2013).
-
Andreasen, N.C. (2007). DSM and the death of phenomenology in America: an example of unintended consequences. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 33(1), 108–112.
-
Binswanger, L. (1922). Einführung in die Probleme der allgemeinen Psychologie. Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer.
-
Binswanger, L. (1933). Űber Ideenflucht. Zürich: Art. Institut Orell Füssli.
-
Binswanger, L. (1947). Ausgewählte Vortrage und Aufsätze; Band 1: Zur phänomenologische Anthropologie. Bern: A. Francke AG. Verlag.
-
Binswanger, L. (1955). Ausgewählte Vortrage und Aufsätze; Band 2: Zur Problematik der psychiatrischen Forschung und zum Problem der Psychiatrie. Bern: Francke Verlag.
-
Binswanger, L. (1957). Schizophrenie. Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske.
-
Binswanger, L. (1957). Der Mensch in der Psychiatrie. Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske.
-
Binswanger, L. (1959). Sprache, Welt und Bildung. Eine sprachphilosophische Untersuchung. Sprachspiegel, 15, 65–71.
-
Binswanger, L. (1960). Melancholie und Manie. Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske.
-
Blankenburg, W. (1994). Zur Einführung. In: Herzog, M., Weltentwürfe. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
-
Bleuler, E. (1911/ 2014). Dementia praecox oder gruppe der schizophrenien. Giessen: Psychosozial Verlag.
-
Broome, M.R., Harland, R., Owen, G.S. & Stringaris, A. (2012). The Maudsley reader in phenomenological psychiatry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-
Costello, C.G. (1992). Research on symptoms versus research on syndromes. British Journal of Psychiatry, 160, 304–308.
-
Cuthbert, B. & Insel, T. (2010). The data of diagnosis: new approaches to psychiatric classification. Psychiatry, 73(4), 311–314.
-
Davidson, L. (1994). Phenomenological research in schizophrenia: From philosophical anthropology to empirical science. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 25(1), 104–130.
-
Davidson, L. (2002). Intentionality, identity and delusions of control in schizophrenia: a Husserlian perspective. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 33(1), 39–58.
-
Davidson, L., Staeheli, M. & Stayner, D. (2004). Language, suffering and the question of immanence: toward a respectful phenomenological psychopathology. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 35(2), 197–232.
-
Den Boer, J.A., Glas, G. & Mooij, A. (2008). Kernproblemen van de psychiatrie. Amsterdam: Boom.
-
Derksen, J. (2007–1). Zijn wij wel narcistische genoeg? Over het ontstaan van onze lentecultuur als gevolg van gewijzigde vroegkinderlijke condities. Nijmegen: PEN Tests Publisher.
-
Derksen, J. (2007–2). Narcistische kwetsbaarheid en belastbaarheid. In: Handboek Arbeid en Belastbaarheid. Houten: Bohn Stafleu van Loghum, 45–72.
-
Derksen, J. (2008). Hoe verandert de intrapsychische architectuur? Tijdschrift voor Psychotherapie, 34–5, 352–368.
-
Derksen, J. (2009). Het narcistisch ideaal. Opvoeden in een tijd van zelfverheerlijking. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.
-
Derksen, J. (2014). Over de identiteit van de procesgerichte psychotherapeut. Tijdschrift voor Psychotherapie, 40–3, p. 222–233.
-
Dilthey, W. (1894). Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie. In: Dilthey’s Gesammelte Schriften, V. Band: Die Geistige Welt. Ersten Hälfte, 1990. Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 139–240.
-
Flanagan, E.H., Davidson, L. & Strauss, J.S. (2010). The need for patient-subjective data in the DSM and the ICD. Psychiatry, 73(4), 297–307.
-
Francis, A. (2013). Saving normal—An insider’s revolt against out-of-control psychiatric diagnosis, DSM-5, Big Pharma and the medicalization of ordinary life. New York: William Morrow / HarperCollins Publishers.
-
Frie, R. (1997). Subjectivity and intersubjectivity in modern philosophy and psychoanalysis: a study of Sartre, Binswanger, Lacan and Habermas. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.
-
Fuchs, T. (2013). Temporality and psychopathology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12–1, 75–104.
-
Ghaemi, S.N. (2003). The concepts of psychiatry. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
-
Giorgi, A. (2009). The descriptive phenomenological method in psychology: a modified Husserlian approach. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
-
Greenberg, G. (2013). The book of woe: the DSM and the unmaking of psychiatry. New York: Penguin Group.
-
Halling, S. & Goldfarb, M. (1996). The new generation of diagnostic manuals (DSM-III, DSM-III-R and DSM-IV): an overview and a phenomenologically based critique. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 27(1), 49–71.
-
Herzog, M. (1994). Weltentwürfe. Berlin: De Gruyter.
-
Horwitz, A.V. & Wakefield, J.C. (2007). The loss of sadness: how psychiatry transformed normal sorrow into depressive disorder. New York: Oxford University Press.
-
Husserl, E. (1925/1962). Husserliana IX—Phänomenologische Psychologie: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
-
Husserl, E. (1950). Husserliana I—Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
-
Husserl, E. (1966). Husserliana X—Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
-
IGDA Workgroup (2003). IDGA. 8: Idiographic (personalized) diagnostic formulation. British Journal of Psychiatry, 182, 55–57.
-
Jaspers, K. (1913/1965). Allgemeine Psychopathologie. Berlin/ Heidelberg/ New York: Springer.
-
Karlsson, G. (1993). Psychological qualitative research from a phenomenological perspective. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.
-
Kendler, K.S., Zachar, P. & Craver, C. (2011). What kinds of things are psychiatric disorders? Psychological Medicine, 41, 1143–1150.
-
Kendler, K.S. (2012). Levels of explanation in psychiatric and substance use disorders: implications for the development of an etiologically based nosology. Molecular Psychiatry, 17, 11–21.
-
Lovell, A.M. (2010). Commentary on “The need for patient-subjective data in the DSM and the ICD”. Psychiatry, 73(4), 318–324.
-
Minkowski, E. (1933). Le temps vécu. Collection de l’Évolution psychiatrique. Paris: Aubier.
-
Mooij, A. (2012). Fenomenologie: belang voor de psychiatrie. In: Denys, D., Meynen, G., Handboek psychiatrie en filosofie. Utrecht: De Tijdstroom, 189–199.
-
Mul, J. de (1993). De tragedie van de eindigheid. Kampen: Kok Agora.
-
Persons, J.B. (1986). The advantages of studying psychological phenomena rather than psychiatric diagnoses. American Psychologist, 41(11), 1252–1260.
-
Pfänder, A. (1913). Zur Psychologie der Gesinnungen (1). Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, Bd.I, 325–404.
-
Pfänder, A. (1916). Zur Psychologie der Gesinnungen (2). Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, Bd.III, 1–125.
-
Phillips, J. (2005). Idiographic formulations, symbols, narratives, context and meaning. Psychopathology, 38, 180–184.
-
Van Beek, W., Berghuis, H., Kerkhof, A.J.F.M. & Beekman, A.T.F. (2011). Time perspective, personality and psychopathology: Zimbardo’s time perspective inventory in psychiatry. Time & Society, 20(3), 364–374.
-
Van Os, J., Gilvarry, C., Bale, R., Van Horn, E., Tattan, T., White, I. & Murray, R. (1999). A comparison of the utility of dimensional and categorical representations of psychosis. Psychological Medicine, 29, 595–606.
-
Van Os, J., Delespaul, P., Wigman, J., Myin-Germeys, I. & Wichers, M. (2013). Psychiatry beyond labels: introducing contextual precision diagnosis across stages of psychopathology. Psychological Medicine, 43(7), 1563–1567.
-
Van Os, J. (2014). Persoonlijke diagnostiek in een nieuwe GGZ. Leusden: Uitgeverij Diagnosis.
-
Van de Pol, A.J.J. & Derksen, J. (2014). The Study of Normal Psychic Life. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 45(2), 113–145.
-
Van Praag, H.M., Asnis, R.S., Kahn, S.L., Brown, M., Korn, J.M., Harkavy Friedman & Wetzler, S. (1990). Nosological tunnel vision in biological psychiatry: a plea for a functional psychopathology. Annals New York Academie of Sciences, 600, 501–510.
-
Regier, D.A., Kuhl, E.A., Kupfer, D.J. & McNulty, J.P. (2010). Patient involvement in the development of DSM-V. Psychiatry, 73(4), 308–310.
-
Spiegelberg, H. (1972). Phenomenology in psychology and psychiatry. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
-
Zahavi, D. & Parnas, J. (2003). Conceptual problems in infantile autism research: why cognitive science needs phenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(9), 53–71.
-
Zahavi, D. (2012). Empathy and Mirroring: Husserl and Gallese. Phaenomenologica, 201, 217–254.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 481 | 86 | 6 |
| Full Text Views | 116 | 2 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 98 | 7 | 1 |
The Incompatibility of Phenomenological Data and Dominant Nosological Systems Like DSM-5: Binswanger’s Psychopathological Phenomenology
In: Journal of Phenomenological PsychologySearch for other papers by Albert-Jan van de Pol in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Search for other papers by Jan Derksen in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
This essay is a response to proposals to integrate patient-subjective or idiographic data into future versions of nosologies such as the DSM and the ICD. It argues that a nosology is not a suitable vehicle for disseminating psychopathological-phenomenological research results throughout the field. Drawing on the work of Ludwig Binswanger, it examines, on the basis of four postulates, how he applies the Husserlian concept of intentionality in psychiatry and thus arrives at a psychopathological phenomenology. For each individual postulate, we then look in depth at the implications for the current debate around DSM. The conclusion we come to is that, both because of the objective of phenomenological research and because of the complexity of the kind of information involved in findings based on that research, it is impossible to integrate these findings into a nosology without deviating from either them or the nosology itself.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 481 | 86 | 6 |
| Full Text Views | 116 | 2 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 98 | 7 | 1 |