Stepping into the Void: Proclus and Damascius on Approaching the First Principle1
In: The International Journal of the Platonic TraditionSearch for other papers by Marilena Vlad in
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In this article, I analyze the idea of “stepping into the void” (κενεµβατεῖν), which can be traced in the thinking of both Proclus and Damascius, but which sets their perspectives apart. Thus, I show how Proclus warns us that to speak about the absolute principle, taking it as an object of thought, is a negative “stepping into the void” that should be avoided. On the contrary, I show that Damascius starts from this warning and tries to prove that the only adequate manner in which we can trace the absolute principle and approach it is precisely through “stepping into the void,” yet, this time, in a positive sense, as a constant attempt to understand that the principle is an absolute void which reverses our discourse.
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Combès J. , '‘Proclus et Damascius’ ', in G. Boss & G. Seel (eds), Proclus et son influence. Actes du colloque de Neuchâtel, juin 1985 , (Grand Midi , Zürich 1987 ) 245 -271 reprinted in Combès (1989) .
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Westerink L. G. , '‘Damascius, Commentateur de Platon’ ', in Le Néoplatonisme, Actes du colloque international du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Royaumont, 9-13 juin 1969 , (CNRS , Paris 1971 ) 253 -260 .
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Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, 1097. 17-20: Ἢ ἔστιν ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ἑνὸς, ἢ οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἢ οὐχ ἓν, ἑκάτερον δὲ ἄτοπον. Τὸ ἄρα πρῶτόν ἐστι τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἓν καὶ ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς καὶ τἀγαθόν. (translation by Glenn R. Morrow and John M. Dillon, p. 444).
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Trabattoni (2011) argues that, for Damascius, the first principle implies a certain contradiction between coordination and incoordination, this contradiction being the distinctive sign of the real first principle. “Le principe qui a la qualité requise, en effet, doit être la non-coordination en tant que telle; mais c’est exactement cette qualité qui crée la contradiction. Dans ce cas, en effet, il n’est pas logiquement possible que la non-coordination absolue maintienne une coordination avec les non-coordinations partielles” (p. 428). Yet, we should notice that, for Damascius, the incoordination is not a quality describing he principle’s nature; in this sense, the principle surpasses any discursive contradiction. See for instance De principiis, R. I, 10. 24-11. 1; W. I, 13. 20-24 (οὐδὲ ταῦτα φύσις αὐτοῦ [. . .] τὸ ἀσύντακτον πρὸς πάντα).
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Gersh (2014) notices that the discussion of the Ineffable “is supplemented by briefer references to it as not a principle, as both a principle and not a principle, and as neither a principle nor not a principle, this alternation providing a classic illustration of the reversal of discourse of which he constantly speaks” (pp. 134-135).
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Gersh (2014) considers the Ineffable as “the ultimate referent of discourse” (p. 126). See also Opsomer (2014), who notices: “Damascius proposes to get rid of all reference to oneness when thinking about the highest. Yet his attempt, too, fails. For Damascius has to find some linguistic expression to refer to it.” (p. 1507). And yet, Damascius does not really refer to this principle, but rather tries to prove that the Ineffable is non-referential. Damascius is actually trying to suggest the Ineffable as that to which we cannot refer in any way, not even through negations. In fact, not even negations can identify the Ineffable as such, as an actual object of negation, as a “denied” (τὸ ἀποφατόν), because “even the denied is a thing, while it [the Ineffable] is nothing, hence, it is not even denied” (De principiis, R. I, 15. 20-21; W. I, 21. 15-16: καὶ τὸ ἀποφατὸν πρᾶγµα, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν, οὐδὲ ἄρα ἀποφατόν). Accordingly, nothing we say succeeds in really making of it an actual “referent” of the discourse, despite the fact that anything we say tends to keep this structure of a discourse referring to something.
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Metry-Tresson (2012) considers that κενεµβατεῖν has a rather pejorative sense for Damascius: “Ce terme porté à un niveau métaphysique exprime en fin de compte la transcendance de ce qui est suressentiel. Damaskios reprend lui aussi cette signification, mais lui confère un sens péjoratif vis-à-vis de la valeur épistémologique de la négation. Tout raisonnement qui tente de saisir le non-être et l’Un est condamné à marcher dans le vide et parce qu’il ne peut rien toucher de ce qui dépasse l’être et engendrer un raisonnement viable, il l’appelle bâtard.” (p. 220) Yet, for Damascius, stepping into the void (κενεµβατεῖν) does not simply indicate the fact that negations uselessly try to seize the principle. On the contrary, he systematically practices this stepping into the void because, for him, the extent to which the principle is ungraspable can only be grasped through realizing that we cannot say anything about it, either affirmatively, or negatively.
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Napoli (2008) suggests that κενεµβατεῖν consists in “un cadere nel nulla constituito dal principio unico del tutto” (p. 334).
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See also Hoffmann (1997), who notices: “La tonalité du Traité des premiers principes, qui à bien des égards tient lieu d’un commentaire de la première hypothèse, est pessimiste, angoissée. Un lecteur attentif y relève des notations presque «existentielles»: les ὠδῖνες de l’âme semblent ne devoir jamais être satisfaites, le discours humain est voué à un renversement (περιτροπή) qui condamne nos pensées et nos opinions à marcher dans le vide (κενεµβατεῖν) parce qu’elles sont vaines” (p. 339).
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See for instance Lavaud (2007): “Damascius introduit cette notion [le renversement] en faisant le constat que le discours négatif n’est pas plus apte à exprimer le premier principe que le discours positif. Nier, en effet, c’est déjà introduire une délimitation entre une qualité et son absence, et c’est donc inévitablement déterminer, enclore dans une nature particulière. En ce sens, le premier principe n’est pas plus indicible que dicible, si l’on entend par indicible ce qui est le simple contradictoire du dicible.” (p. 53).
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Metry-Tresson (2012) describes stepping into the void as an annihilation of our thinking, which ceases to exist: “Là où il n’y a plus de point d’appui pour elle, là où il n’y a plus aucun objet, la pensée cesse tout bonnement d’être. [. . .] Lorsque la pensée «marche dans le vide» - image chère à Damaskios - elle n’est plus que néant au sein du néant. Il n’y plus ni métaphysique, ni dialectique. Si tout a été dépassé, et donc les apories aussi, nous ne sommes plus que néant de connaissance et d’inconnaissance. [. . .] Les pensées et les mots ont éclaté.” (p. 74). “Ce verbe «marcher dans le vide» exprime une expérience insolite et très déstabilisante pour la pensée, celle du «sans-objet» et du sans appui, du vide, et du vertige.” (p. 80).
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Stepping into the Void: Proclus and Damascius on Approaching the First Principle1
In: The International Journal of the Platonic TraditionSearch for other papers by Marilena Vlad in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
In this article, I analyze the idea of “stepping into the void” (κενεµβατεῖν), which can be traced in the thinking of both Proclus and Damascius, but which sets their perspectives apart. Thus, I show how Proclus warns us that to speak about the absolute principle, taking it as an object of thought, is a negative “stepping into the void” that should be avoided. On the contrary, I show that Damascius starts from this warning and tries to prove that the only adequate manner in which we can trace the absolute principle and approach it is precisely through “stepping into the void,” yet, this time, in a positive sense, as a constant attempt to understand that the principle is an absolute void which reverses our discourse.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 727 | 78 | 11 |
| Full Text Views | 762 | 3 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 131 | 1 | 0 |