Francis Turretin and Jonathan Edwards on Compatibilism

In: Journal of Reformed Theology
Paul Helm King’s College UK London

Search for other papers by Paul Helm in
Current site
Google Scholar
Download Citation Get Permissions

Access options

Get access to the full article by using one of the access options below.

Institutional Login

Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials

Login via Institution


Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):



The aim of this article is to show that the claim of Richard Muller in his recent book Divine Will and Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in Early Modern Reformed Thought, that the Reformed Orthodox were not compatibilists in their view of freedom but held to the indeterminate freedom of the will, is false. The argument takes the reader through Turretin’s claim in his Institutes that freedom does not consist in indifference but in rational spontaneity. It assesses Muller’s argument that indeterminate freedom incorporates choices between two or more contraries and of none by showing that Edwards respected the same distinctions, and that Turretin and Edwards were agreed that God, the human nature of Christ, and the redeemed in heaven did not act from indifference. The article ends with remarks on Muller’s interpretation of Turretin’s position, that it involves ‘multiple potencies,’ arguing that this proposal meets serious difficulties.

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 901 287 23
Full Text Views 198 16 0
PDF Views & Downloads 334 38 0