This paper examines the relationship between human sin and divine hiddenness, drawing on views that are widely acknowledged within the Reformed tradition. It argues, first, that according to these views there is no inculpable nonbelief, and thus, second, that a crucial premise in the atheistic argument from divine hiddenness is untenable. The overarching question here is: If there is a sensus divinitatis, is it possible to be an inculpable nonbeliever? To answer this question, the cognitive effects of sin on our sensus divinitatis as a faculty of producing basic beliefs about God will be assessed. I conclude that the premise which many find plausible—that there is inculpable nonbelief—is in fact controversial and dubious.
See DavidsonEssays on Actions and Events42-43. This idea is famously represented as the enkratic condition of rationality: Necessarily if you are rational then if you believe your reasons require you to F you intend to F. Obviously the enkratic condition says that akrasia is irrational. See John Broome ‘Rationality’ in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action ed. Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis (Blackwell 2010) 285-92. And also his ‘Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons?’ Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (2007) 349-74.