1 See, for example, Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment, Int'l Law. 39 (2005), p. 87. 2 Confer the following selection: Vasciannie, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice, BYIL 70 (1999), p. 99; Unctad, Fair and Equitable Treatment, UNCTAD/ITE/Il'r/11 (Vol. Ill), New York 1999; Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2004/3; Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, JWIT 6 (2005), p. 357; Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the Rule of Law, TDM 3 (2006), issue #5; Muchlinski, 'Caveat Investor'? The Relevance ofthe Conduct of the Investor under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, ICLQ 55 (2006), p. 527; Westcott, Recent Practice on Fair and Equitable Treatment, Jwrr 8 (2007), p. 409; Mayeda, Playing Fair: The Meaning of Fair and Equitable Treatment in Bilateral Investment Treaties, Jw 41 (2007), 273; Orakhelashvili, The Normative Basis of "Fair and Equitable Treatment ", ArchVR 46 (2008), p. 74; Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the Intemational Law of Foreign Investment, Oxford 2008.

3 T. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford 1995; and The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, Oxford 1990. 4 See Lowenfeld, Intemational Economic Law, 2nd ed., Oxford 2008, p. 556; UNcTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006, UNCTAI)/ITE/I[T/2006/5, New York 2007, p. 28. 5 See Article 1105 (1) NAFTA and Article 10 (1) ECT.

Confer Vasciannie (supra note 2), pp. 126-127. On the history of the BIT movement, see, for example, Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, Int'l Law. 24 (1990), pp. 656-664; Sacerdoti, Bilateral Trearies and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection, RdC 269 (1997), pp. 298-302; Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 12 (2005), p. 157. " On the minimum standard, confer only Roth, The Minimum Standard of International Law Applied to Aliens, Leiden 1949. On an analysis of different drafting approaches as regards fair and equitable treatment, confer Unctad (supra note 4), pp. 30-33; Tudor (supra note 2), pp. 15-52. 10 Approval of the plain meaning is, for example, expressed by Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties, Int'l Tax & Bus. Law. 4 (1986), p. 125; Dolzer, Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties, The Hague 1995, p. 59; Vasciannie (supra note 2), pp. 104-105, 144; Schreuer (supra note 2), pp. 364. tr See Vasciannie (ibid.), p. 103. 12 Mann, Bntish Treaties for the Formation and Protection of Investment, BYIL 24 (1981), p. 244; more restrictive Mann, The Leqal Aspect of Money, 5th ed., Oxford 1992, pp. 427, 526; for a detailed discussion of Mann's statement especially in the context of Article 1105 NAFTA, see Thomas, Reflection on Art. 1105 of NAFTA, ICSID Rev. - F.I.Lj. 17 (2002), pp. 51-58, submitting that the statement was somewhat blindfold introduced as an argument into the debate on fair and equitable treatment. See already Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investments and Intemational Law, London 1969, p. 158.

14 See Gamer (ed.), Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed., St. Paul 2004, describing "equitable" as "[just; consistent with principles ofjustice and right" and "fair" with the words "[i]mpartial; jusr equitable" and "[f]ree from bias or prejudice". �5 Approval of the equating approach is, for example, expressed by Caflisch, La pratique Suisse en matiere de droit international public 1979, Schweizerisches Jahrbuch fzir intemationales Recht 36 (1980), pp. 178-179; Krafft, Les accords bilateraux sur la protection des investissements condus par la Suisse, in: Dicke (ed.), Foreign Investment in the Present and a New International Economic Order, Fribourg 1987, p. 79; Kohona, Investment Protection Agreements, JWT 21 (1987), p. 91; Comeaux, Kinsella, Protecting Foreign Investment under International Law, Dobbs Ferry 1997, p. 106. �6 Though not supporting this view, see Vasciannie (supra note 2), pp. 104-105. �� Neer (UsA) v. United Mexican States, General Claims Commission - United States and Mexico, 25 October 1926, UN Riaa 4 (1926), pp. 61-62. 18 See also Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des volkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht, Heidelberg 1963, pp. 83-85. �9 Similar Sornarajah, 77re International Law on Foreign Investment, 2nd ed., Cambridge 2004, pp. 329-330. 20 The NAFTA Free Trade Commission's Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, 31 July 2001 (available at www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/nafta-interpr.aspx? lang=en, last visit 20 May 2010), limiting fair and equitable treatment to the customary minimum standard, are clearly driven by that fear and must be understood as a reaction to far-reaching awards favouring the plain meaning approach, in particular the case of Pope & Talbot v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL (NnF rn), final merits award (10 April 2001). For further discussion, confer, for example, Thomas (supra note 12).

21 Pope & Talbot v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), award on damages (31 May 2002), paras. 57-62; similar Mondev International v. United States of America, award (11 October 2002), Icsli) Case No. A)m(AF)/99/2, para. 125; Waste Management v. United Mexican Siates, award (30 April 2004), ICSID Case No. Alu3(AF)/00/3, paras. 91-93. z= See Mondev Intemational v. United States of America (ibid.), para. 125. z3 See, for example, Occidental Exploration & Production v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL (London Court of International Arbitration), final award (1 July 2004), Case No. UN 3467, para. 192; C.us Gas Transmission Company v. Republic ofargentitia, award on the mcrits (12 May 2005), ICSID Case No. ARB/01l8, paras. 282-284; Azurix Corp. and Others v. Republic of Argentina, award (14 July 2006), ICSID Case No. AIUJ/01/12, paras. 364-372. z4 On the methodology of arbitral tribunals, see also Schill (supra note 2), pp. 5 (et see.), Dolzcr, Schreucr, Principles of International Investment Gaw, Oxford 2008, p. 133. See, for example, Motidev International v. United States ofAmerica (supra note 21), para. 118; ADC Affiliate and Others v. Republic ofhutigary, award (2 October 2006), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, para. 445.

=� One of the most elaborate and prominent definitions has been given by the tribunal in "!ëwicas Medioambientales TECMED v. United Mexican States, award (29 May 2003), ICSID Case No. Ann(AF)/00/2, para. 154. It is, however, questionable whether short-hand definitions, as the one in the TECMED case, are always cited and understood correctly by later tribunals, confer the criticism by Douglas, Nothing if Not Critical for Investment Arbitration: Occidental, Eureko and Methanex, Arb. Int'l 22 (2006), p. 27-28. 27 See, for example, Robert Azilliatl and Others v. United Mexican States, award (1 November 1999), 1(:SID Case No. Aizs(AF)/97/2, para. 99; Mondev International v. United States qf America (supra note 21), para. 126. zN Anc Affiliate and Others v. Republic of Hungary (supra note 25), paras. 435, 445. 2" Victor 1'ey Casado and Others v. Republic of Chile, award (22 April 2008), lcsil) Case No. ARH/9R/2, paras. 656 (et seq.). 3° Confer The Loeuxn Group and Others v. United States of America, award (26 June 2003), ICSID Case No. AEtn(AF)/98/3, paras. 134 (et seq.); International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. United Mexican States, UN(;ITRAL, arbitral award (26 January 2006), para. 200. 3� See especially The Loewen Group and Others v. United States of America (ibid.), paras. 153 (et seq.); see also Metalpar and Others v. Republic of Argentina, award on the merits (6 June 2008), ICSJD Case No. ARIJ/03/5, para. 181. 32 A different view is expressed by the tribunal in Methanex Corporation v. United States ofAmerica, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), final award on jurisdiction and merits (3 August 2005), part IV, chapter C, paras. 14 (et seq.), considering non-discrimination not to be part of fair and equitable treatment.

33 See, for example, CHS Gas Transmission Company v. Republic of Argentina (supra note 23), para. 290; Saluka Investments v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, partial award (17 March 2006), paras. 460-461. 'a S.D. Myers v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), first partial award (13 November 2000), para. 254. 35 Confer only McLachlan, Shore, Weininger, International Investment Arbitration, Oxford 2007, p. 243. 3(, See Saluka Investments v. The Czech Republic (supra note 33), paras. 307, 313. 31 Thereon generally, see Walter, L7te Investor's Expectations in International Investment Law, in: Reinisch, Knahr (eds.), International Investment Law in Context, Utrecht 2008, p. 175. 3H See e.g. Metaklad Corporation v. United Mexican States, award (30 August 2000), ICSW Case No. AR.B(AF)/97/1, paras. 85 (et seq.); "lëmicas Medioarnbientales Tecniso v. United Mexican States (supra note 26), paras. 154 (et seq.); Irltematiotlal1hutlderbird Gaming Corporation v. United Mexican States (supra note 30), para. 147. 3' See Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic qfectiador (supra note 23), paras. 183, 191. 40 LG&E Energy Corp. and Others v. Republic of Argentina, decision on liability (3 October 2006), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, paras. 130 (et seq.); Enron Corporation and Others v. Republic ofArgentina, award (22 May 2007), ICSID Case No. Aitti/01 /3, paras. 264 (et seq.); more restrictive Meralpar and Others v. Republic ofArgentina (supra note 31), paras. 185-186. A violation of fair and equitable treatment on the basis of a breach of contract has, for example, been determined in Eureko v. Republic of Poland, UNCITRAL, partial award on liability (19 August 2005), paras. 231-233. More reluctant are the tribunals in Waste Management v. United Mexican States (supra note 21), paras. 109 (et seq.); Impregilo v. Islamic Kepublic of Pakistan, decision on jurisdiction (22 April 2005), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, paras. 260 (et seq.); Parkerings-Compagniet v. Lt'thuania, award (11 September 2007), ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, paras. 316 (et seq.).

12MetakladCorporationv.UnitedMexicanStates (supra note 38), para. 76; Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED v. United Mexican States (supra note 26), para. 154. 4' A breach of fair and equitable treatment due to a denial of access to administrative files has been affirmed in Siemens v. Republic of Argentina, award (6 Febmary 2007), Icsio Case No. ARB/02/8, paras. 114, 308; but denied in Parkerings-Compagniet v. Lithuattia (supra note 41), para. 307. ^a Confer, for example, Steven Schwebel's witness statement in A�YD Equity and Others v. Republic of Chile, award (25 May 2004), 1(:sii) Case No. ARB/O 1 /7, para. 109. 45 Confer especially Saluka Investments v. The Czech Republic (supra note 33), paras. 304 (et seg.), 460. Another tribunal refused to take the reasonableness and the effectiveness of a state measure into account, see BG Group v. Republic ofa�qentiiia, UNCITRAL, final award (24 December 2007), paras. 339-344. 46 See Saluka Investments v. The Czech Republic (ibid.), para. 306; Intematio,wl17l1ltlderbird Gaming Corporation v. United Mexican States (supra note 30), separate opinion by Thomas Walde, paras. 30, 102. ^� Confer, for example, the detailed examination of case law in Tudor (supra note 2), pp. 154-181; see also most other recent publications listed supra in note 2. as Dolzer, The Impad of International Investment Treaties on Domestir Administrative Law, N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 37 (2005), p. 964.

4' Similarly Schill (supra note 2), p. 7, tries to solve the problem of the doctrinal concept of fair and equitable treatment through a comparative law approach by tying the standard and its sub-elements to the concept of the rule of law. so Denying the legitimacy of fair and equitable treatment as a legal norm is Porterfield, An International Common Law of Investor Rights?, U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 27 (2006), p. 113; more generally, confer S. Franck, Hie Legitimacy Crisis in International Treaty Arbitration, Fordham L. Rcv. 73 (2005), p. 1521. 51 See, for example, Mayeda (supra note 2), p. 284, proposing that fair and equitable treatment should not provide substantial but only procedural protection; sec also Orakhelashvili (supra note 2), p. 104, trying to limit fair and equitable treatment to non-discrimination and non-denial of justice. sz Sempra Energy International v. Republic of Argentina, award (28 September 2007), ICSID Case No. ARS/02/ 16, para. 300.

53 For a critical discussion of Franck's theory, confer the articles of the Symposiwn on 71lOlIIas M. F'ranck's Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995), EJIL 13 (2002), pp. 901 (ct seq.); see also Wolfrum, Roben (eds.), Legitimacy in International Law, Berhn 2008. For a general criticism on constmctivist models of balancing, confer, for example, Koskennienti, from Apolayy to Cltopia, Cambridge 2005 (reissue), pp. 258 (rt seq.). 54 T. Franck, Fairness (supra note 3), p. 6. 55 Ibid., pp. 7-9. sb Ibid., p. 7. 57 Ibid. �s Ibid., p. 26. 5" Ibid., pp. 25-46.

60 Ibid., p. 30. 61 T. Franck, Legitimacy (supra note 3), p. 57. fi2 T. Franck, Fairness (supra note 3), p. 38. fi; Ibid., p. 41. Confcr ibid., pp. 47 (et see.). On the role of equity in international law, see also Francioni, L'quity in International La1/', in: Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, online edition, Oxford 2008 (available at www.mpepil.com. last visit 20 May 2010). 65 T. Franck, Fairness (supra note 3), p. 58. ss Ibid., p. 65. 6' On the distinction between equity and ev oeguo et bonn, see ibid., pp. 54-56. 6X Ibid., pp. 75-76. m See also Schwarzenberger, 77re Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad, Current Legal Problems 14 (1961), p. 221; Lauterpacht, Aspects of the Administration of International fustice, Cambridge 1991, p. 122; Vasciannic (supra note 2), pp. 145-147; Lowe, Fair and Equitable 7'rentment, Am- Proc. 100 (2006), p. 73. '!' While not elaborating on fair and equitable treatment, Franck acknowledges that international investment law is a forum where the pull to stability and the push for change is becoming exceptionally apparent, see T. Franck, Fairness (supra note 3), pp. 438 (et seq.).

71 Ibid., p. 7. The fairness discourse as exposed by Franck is influenced by the discourse model of Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, Cambridge (Massachusctts) 1971. 72 T. Franck, Fairness (supra note 3), pp. 9-22. 73 Ibid., p. 10. 74 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 75 In this way Porterfield (supra note 50), p. 113. '� Thereon T. Franck, Legitimacy (supra note 3), pp. 41 (et seq.).

77 Ibid., p. 53. z& Ibid., p. 56. 7. Ibid., p. 68. ri° Ibid., pp. 67 (et seq.). Franck's distinction and its denotation are inspired by Dostoyevsky's famous The Idiot and Crime and Punishment. Franck associates idiot norms with Prince Myshkin, "whose characteristics include his single-minded passion for arrow-like truths, 'simple' principles and comprehensive mastery of self and others in accordance with these invariable verities, regardless of dangerous, even absurd, consequences"; whereas sophist norms are reflective of the moral dilemma resulting from Raskolnikov's murder, embodying "a carefully calibrated system of regulatory and justificatory principles" and the threat of being instrumentalized; see T. Franck, Porfiry's Proposition, in: Dinstein (ed.), International Law at a Time of Perplexity, Dordrecht 1989, pp. 169, 178. T. Franck, Legitimacy (supra note 3), pp. 74, 77. 82 Ibid., pp. 77-78. s3 Ibid., p. 75. Franck's category of sophist norms reveals considerable similarities to the characteristics of "general clauses" that are well-known in Civil Law statutory codifications, on the latter see, for example, Alexy, Dreier, Statutory Interpretation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in: MacCormick (ed.), Interpreting Statutes, Aldershot 1991, pp. 74-77. g4 T. Franck, Legitimacy (supra note 3), pp. 79-80.

es See also Scobbie, Tom Franck's Faimess, EJIL 13 (2002), p. 914. Rh T. Franck, Fairness (supra note 3), p. 79. R� Confer, for example, Unctad (supra note 2), p. 11. 88 See T. Franck, Legitimacy (supra note 3), p. 64. 89 Ibid., p. 61.

90 Ibid., pp. 61, 64. See ibid., pp. 64-65. 9z To different suggestions on reforming the investment arbitration system, confer S. Franck (supra note 50), pp. 1587 (et seq.). 9; A possible way in doing so is the approach as suggested by Schill (supra note 49). A positive example from arbitral jurisprudence is provided by the enlightening discussion on the protection of legitimate expectations made by Thomas Walde in his separate opinion in the case of International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. United Mexican States (supra note 30). y4 On the problems of comparing investments in the context of non-discrimination, confer, for example, Maniruzzaman, Expropriation of Alien Property and the Printiple of Non-Discrimination in International Law of Foreign Investment, J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 58 (1998), pp. 72-73. 9s For a similar perception in the context of a sophist norm in German private law, confer Teubner, 242 BCB, in: Wassermann (ed.), Altemativkommentar zum Buergerlichen Gesetzbuch, Neuwied 1980, vol. 2, margin number 4.

96 Available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/29030.doc, last visit 20 May 2010. 9� Franck, Le�qitimacy (supra note 3), p. 144. y8 Ibid., pp. 147-148. The notion "principle" is used by Franck in the sense of Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, London 1977, see especially at pp. 24-26. The notion "coherence" is overlapping with Dworkin's "integrity", on the latter see Dworkin, Lam's Empire, London 1986, pp. 176-224. 99 See Franck, Legitimacy (supra note 3), p. 180. 100 Ibid., p. 153.

101 Thereon see Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, Fordham Int'l LJ. 30 (2007), pp. 1031 (et seq.); McLachlan, Shore, Weininger (supra note 35), pp. 71 (et seq.); see also the discussion in Aes Corporation v. Republic ofargentina, Decision on Jurisdiction (26 April 2005), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, paras. 18-45. 102 McLachlan, Shore, Weininger (supra note 35), p. 74, speak of a "de facto doctrine of precedent". 103 See the numerous examples given by S. Franck (supra note 50), pp. 1558 (et seq.). 104 This problem is exemplified by the contradictory decisions in Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNC:ITRAL, final award (2 September 2001); and Cm Czech Republic v. Czech Republic, Uncitral, partial award (13 September 2001). See Jennings, Watts, Oppenheim's International Law, 9th ed., Harlow 1992, vol. I, p. 1275, especially footnote 21; Koskenniemi, Fragmentation ofititernational Law, Report of the Study Group of the ILC (13 April 2006), UN Document A/CN.4/L.682, pp. 214-215; Lindcrfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties, Dordrecht 2007, p. 177. �°6 See Fischer-Lescano, Teubner, Regime-Kollisionen, Frankfurt 2006, pp. 170-171, preferring "compatibility" as a more realistic aim.

�°� Confer also Weiler, NAt-'f;a Article 1105 and the Principles of International Economic Law, Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 42 (2003), p. 35. t°s Indicating, however, that the discourse may be general and normative or dispute specific, see T. Franck, Fairness (supra note 3), p. 441.

109 Ibid., p. 7. 110 See e.g. in the case of Cnts Gas Transmission Company v. Republic of Argentina (supra note 23), para. 274. 111 T. Franck, Fairness (supra note 3), p. 7. "2 See, however, Tudor (supra note 2), p. 205, denying the possibility of a balancing operation at the liability phase of fair and equitable treatment. See T. Franck, Faimess (supra note 3), pp. 14 (et seq.). 114 Ibid., pp. 16-18. "5 Thereto ibid., pp. 18-22. "6 Ibid., p. 18. For a critical discussion of this idea, confer Tasioulas, Intemational Law and the Limits of Fairness, EJIL 13 (2002), pp. 1014 (et seq.). 117 Thereon, for example, Unctad, Foreign Direct Investment and Development, UIYCTnn/ITE/I1T/10 (Vol. I), New York 1999; see also the preamble of the German model BIT from 2005, available at ArchVR 45 (2007), p. 276.

118 Confer the valuable analysis guided by Aguilar Alvarez, Reisman (eds.), The Reasons Requirement in International Investment Arbitration: Critical Case Studies, Leiden 2008. tl9 Saluka Investments v. The Czech Republic (supra note 33), paras. 305, 306; similar International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. United Mexican States (supra note 30), separate opinion by Thomas Walde, para. 102. 120 Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, award (13 November 2000), ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, paras. 67, 71. 121 Parkerings-Compagniet v. Lithuania (supra note 41), para. 392. 122 ADC Affiliate and Others v. Republic of Hungary (supra note 25), para. 423.